An Untapped “Arsenal of Power”: the Elections Clause, a Federal Election Administration Agency, and Federal Election Oversight by Newkirk, Zachary
Florida State University Law Review 
Volume 47 
Issue 1 In Tribute to Talbot "Sandy" D'Alemberte Article 8 
Fall 2019 
An Untapped “Arsenal of Power”: the Elections Clause, a Federal 
Election Administration Agency, and Federal Election Oversight 
Zachary Newkirk 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr 
 Part of the Election Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Zachary Newkirk, An Untapped “Arsenal of Power”: the Elections Clause, a Federal Election Administration 
Agency, and Federal Election Oversight, 47 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 143 (2019) . 
https://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol47/iss1/8 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Florida State University Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository. For more 
information, please contact efarrell@law.fsu.edu. 
AN UNTAPPED “ARSENAL OF POWER”:  
THE ELECTIONS CLAUSE,  
A FEDERAL ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AGENCY,  
AND FEDERAL ELECTION OVERSIGHT 
ZACHARY NEWKIRK* 
“This is the only modern nation in the world that dares not control its 
own elections.”—W.E.B. Du Bois1 
 I. INTRODUCTION .....................................................................  144 
 II. THE ENFORCEMENT ACTS OF 1870–71 ................................  148 
 A. The Enforcement Acts’ Context .....................................  149 
 B. The Enforcement Acts’ Provisions ................................  151 
 C. The Enforcement Acts in Action ...................................  153 
 D. Evaluating the Enforcement Acts .................................  159 
 1. The Enforcement Acts’ Problems of Law ................  160 
 2. The Enforcement Acts’ Problems of  
Administration ........................................................  164 
 III. CONGRESS’S AUTHORITY IN A MODERN  
ENFORCEMENT ACT ..............................................................  168 
 A. Congress’s Authority Over Federal Elections ...............  168 
 B. Congress’s Authority Over State and Local  
Elections ........................................................................  173 
 IV. FEDERAL ELECTION ADMINISTRATION LEGISLATION ..........  177 
 A. Toward Neutrality and Uniformity:   
The Federal Election Administration Agency ..............  178 
 1. The Agency’s Structure:  
Embracing Neutrality, Avoiding  Gridlock ...........  178 
 2. The Federal Election Administration  
Agency’s Rulemaking ..............................................  182 
 3. Adjudication ............................................................  188 
 B. Federal Election Oversight ...........................................  190 
 1. The Need for Federal Election Oversight ...............  190 
 2. The Mechanics of Federal Election Oversight .......  194 
 
 * Voting rights attorney in Washington, D.C. J.D. & M.A., history, 2017, Duke Uni-
versity School of Law; B.A., 2012, Cornell University. The views expressed here do not reflect 
the views of any past or current employer. Thank you to Judge Mark E. Walker, Professors 
Kathryn Bradley, Guy-Uriel Charles, Anthony Gaughan, and Rebecca Scott, as well as to 
Sam Ferenc, Priya Khangura, Josh Lawson, Dimitri Peteves, and Tim Saviola, who, at var-
ious points during the research and writing process, offered thoughtful insight, helpful edits, 
and probing questions. Special gratitude to Meaghan Newkirk for her unflappable editing 
skills and infinite support.  
 1. W.E.B. Du Bois, The Negro Citizen, in THE NEGRO IN AMERICAN CIVILIZATION 461, 
469 (Charles S. Johnson ed., 1930). 
 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:143 
 
144 
 V. CONCLUSION ........................................................................  198 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
In January 2019, Democratic members of the House of Represent-
atives introduced H.R. 1—the For the People Act of 2019.2 The sprawl-
ing 571-page bill introduces sweeping reforms to voting rights,  
campaign finance, and government ethics. Among the proposed  
reforms: automatic voter registration, online and same-day voter  
registration, requiring at least 15 consecutive days of early voting  
in locations near public transportation, requiring paper ballots, pro-
hibiting states’ chief election officers from participating in federal  
political campaigns, promoting enhanced cybersecurity standards,  
requiring presidential candidates to release tax returns—the list goes 
on.3 The House passed H.R. 1 in March 2019, but the bill has stalled 
in the Senate.4 While unlikely to become law during the 116th Con-
gress, H.R. 1 offers one roadmap for future electoral reform. More  
recently, presidential candidate Senator Elizabeth Warren unveiled 
an election reform plan that would create uniform federal standards 
for elections and implement reforms such as automatic voter registra-
tion and prohibiting voter purges.5 
This Article envisions an alternative model for electoral reform  
to supplement bold reform efforts like H.R. 1 and Warren’s federal 
standards—expanded, citizen-initiated federal oversight of elections 
and a centralized federal election administration. Channeling deep, 
untapped power authorized under the Fifteenth Amendment, and  
especially the Elections Clause, Congress can establish a nonpartisan, 
independent Federal Election Administration Agency.6 Congress can 
also create an effective federal election oversight program. These two 
reforms would combat some well-known ills that hamper American 
elections—a hyper-decentralized patchwork of election administration 
that varies wildly nationwide, which, in many jurisdictions, partisan 
 
 2. H.R. 1, 116th Cong. (2019).  
 3. Id. Even the summary of the law is a hefty twenty-two pages. See H.R. 1: The For 
The People Act of 2019, https://democracyreform-sar-banes.house.gov/sites/democracyre-
formtaskforce.house.gov/files/H.R.%201%20Section-by-Section_FINAL.pdf. 
 4. Catie Edmondson, House Passes Democrats’ Centerpiece Anti-Corruption and  
Voting Rights Bill, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2019), available at https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2019/03/08/us/politics/house-democrats-anticorruption-voting-rights.html [https://perma.cc/ 
R4JE-JCF9]. 
 5. Elizabeth Warren, My Plan to Strengthen Democracy, MEDIUM (June 25, 2019), 
https://medium.com/@teamwarren/my-plan-to-strengthen-our-democracy-6867ec1bcd3c 
[https://perma.cc/6PZE-TCJB]. 
 6. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Beyond the Discrimination Model on Voting, 127 
HARV. L. REV. 95, 113 (2013) (asserting “[i]nstead of the limited race-driven use of equal 
protection and the Fifteenth Amendment, there is untested room for expansion of congres-
sional intervention under the Elections Clause”). 
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officials oversee; crippled federal oversight in the wake of Shelby 
County v. Holder7; and court-dependent (and sometimes untimely) 
remedies for election disputes. A nonpartisan, independent Federal 
Election Administration Agency would set nationwide standards  
for the “Times, Places, and Manner” of federal elections.8 It would  
independently adjudicate election disputes without burdening federal 
courts and risking the judiciary’s further politicization. And, at the  
initiative of voters, the federal government would oversee election  
administration in any jurisdiction—just as the federal government  
did across the South and the urban North in the late nineteenth  
century with the Enforcement Acts.9 
The goal of this Article is to propose a model of election administra-
tion and adjudication that both insulates election law from partisan-
ship and narrows the path for political actors to change the rules  
for their perceived benefit. A group of neutral and apolitical election 
professionals can exist at the federal level. Meanwhile, efforts to 
change the rules from political parties, activists, and legislators would 
have to operate within this administrative framework—through  
multiple layers of nonpartisan processes that aim to insulate election 
administrators from partisan influence. Ultimately, this Article  
argues that federal election administration is constitutional, has am-
ple historical precedent rooted in the nineteenth century’s Enforce-
ment Acts, and offers antidotes to this hyper-partisan era of election 
administration.  
A federal election administrative agency has a natural place in  
recent scholarship. A group of election law scholars—the “New Insti-
tutionalists”10—has written extensively over the past decade on the 
role that nonjudicial institutions can play to improve election admin-
istration.11 In “The Institutional Turn in Election Law Scholarship,” 
Heather Gerken and Michael Kang outline several “hard” and “soft” 
 
 7. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013) (invalidating Section 4(b)’s preclearance 
formula as a violation of the equal state sovereignty doctrine, thereby ending the require-
ment for some jurisdictions to seek federal preclearance for election law changes). 
 8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
 9. See infra pp. 12–18. 
 10. Richard L. Hasen, Election Administration Reform and the New Institutionalism, 
98 CAL. L. REV. 1075, 1076 (2010) [hereinafter Hasen, New Institutionalism] (coining the 
moniker “New Institutionalists” to describe election law scholars advancing institutions as 
mechanisms for electoral reform). 
 11. See, e.g., Daniel P. Tokaji, The Future of Election Reform: From Rules to Institutions, 
28 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 125, 128 (2009) [hereinafter Tokaji, The Future of Election Reform] 
(describing the “institutional turn” in election law scholarship and providing examples from 
leaders in the field). Some, for example, have advocated for advisory commissions. See  
Christopher S. Elmendorf, Election Commissions and Electoral Reform, 5 ELECTION L.J. 425 
(2006). Others have advocated for a Democracy Index. See HEATHER K. GERKEN, THE 
DEMOCRACY INDEX: WHY OUR ELECTION SYSTEM IS FAILING AND HOW TO FIX IT (2009). 
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reforms to advance changes to election administration “by redirecting 
the existing politics that control election law.”12 “Hard” approaches  
reform the lawmaking institutions that create election law by seeking 
to “reconfigure existing lawmaking institutions or to create new insti-
tutions that produce new, better incentives for political leaders” to  
reform election administration.13 “Soft” approaches, on the other hand, 
involve ways to change elite incentives toward reform without chang-
ing lawmaking processes.14 This Article’s proposals, inspired in part  
by nineteenth century federal election practices, exist on the “hard” 
side of Gerken and Kang’s spectrum. 
This Article contributes to institution-centered election law schol-
arship in two ways. First, it suggests that possible solutions for  
contemporary election administration woes exist in forgotten corners 
of American history. Election law scholars have looked to political  
science and economics to complement their analyses with varying  
results.15 Historical analysis can—and should—inform the present. 
Examining the successes and failures of now-gone federal institutions 
can provide some novel ideas for those riding the institutional wave in 
election law scholarship.16  
Second, an administrative model for nonpartisan election admin-
istration aims to be a “breath of fresh air from earlier juricentric think-
ing about reform”—that is, a turn away from court-centered reforms.17 
Even as some scholars assert that it is “critical that courts play an 
active role in supervising the administration of elections,”18 history 
 
 12. Heather K. Gerken & Michael S. Kang, The Institutional Turn in Election Law 
Scholarship in RACE, REFORM, AND REGULATION OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS: RECURRING 
PUZZLES IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 86, 90 (Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Heather K. Gerken &  
Michael S. Kang eds., 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted) [hereinafter Gerken & Kang, 
The Institutional Turn]. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 91. 
 15. David Schleicher, Overview: Mapping Election Law’s Interior in RACE, REFORM, AND 
REGULATION OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS: RECURRING PUZZLES IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 
75, 79 (Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Heather K. Gerken & Michael S. Kang eds., 2011).  
 16. In the fields of federalism, voter qualifications, and the Elections Clause, Professor 
Franita Tolson has time and again masterfully examined historical practices. See, e.g.,  
Franita Tolson, The Elections Clause and the Underenforcement of Federal Law, 129 YALE 
L.J. F. 171, 171–84 (2019); Franita Tolson, The Spectrum of Congressional Authority Over 
Elections, 99 B.U. L. REV. 317, 341–67 (2019) [hereinafter Tolson, Spectrum of Congressional 
Authority]; Franita Tolson, Protecting Political Participation through the Voter Qualifica-
tions Clause of Article I, 56 B.C. L. REV. 159, 186–204 (2015); Franita Tolson, Reinventing 
Sovereignty?: Federalism as a Constraint on the Voting Rights Act, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1195, 
1219–41 (2012) [hereinafter Tolson, Reinventing Sovereignty?]. 
 17. Hasen, New Institutionalism, supra note 10, at 1098. But see Daniel P. Tokaji & 
Owen Wolfe, Baker, Bush, and Ballot Boards: The Federalization of Election Administration, 
62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 969, 971 (2012) (praising the increased role of federal judges as 
impartial arbiters in election-related litigation). 
 18. Tokaji, The Future of Election Reform, supra note 11, at 129. 
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suggests that election administration litigation has the risk of over-
whelming the federal courts.19 Contemporary scholars note that judge-
centered reforms risk judges falling back on their personal preferences 
or ending in “highly formalistic” opinions.20 What is more, the injection 
of election litigation into the courts risks further politicizing the  
judiciary.21 
Thus, a turn toward a new institution in the federal administrative 
state is sensible. Commentators over the last decade have proposed 
turning to administrative law fundamentals in approaching election 
law topics (particularly redistricting), but to date, there has been little 
advocacy for a federal election administration entity.22 This gap in elec-
tion law scholarship is notable, considering how an administrative 
agency could remedy election administration ills like partisanship and 
decentralization—symptoms that are well known and increasingly  
apparent during election seasons.23 
The point of this Article is not whether a neutral federal agency is 
the ideal mechanism for effective election administration.24 Instead, it 
tackles the fundamental building blocks necessary to bring such an 
agency into being and envisions what it might look like. A decade ago, 
for example, Daniel Tokaji cautiously wrote that robust election  
administration reform should occur at the state level “[u]ntil such  
time as the United States develops an effective federal agency for 
 
 19. See infra text accompanying notes 200–06 (detailing burdens Enforcement Acts 
placed on federal judges). 
 20. Gerken & Kang, The Institutional Turn, supra note 12, at 89; see also Richard L. 
Hasen, The 2016 U.S. Voting Wars: From Bad to Worse, 26 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 629, 
629 & 634 (2018) [hereinafter Hasen, From Bad to Worse] (noting that the “judiciary itself 
often divides along partisan lines” in deciding election law cases and “[t]here is every reason 
to believe the partisan divide in voting wars cases endures on the Supreme Court”). 
 21. Hasen, From Bad to Worse, supra note 20, at 635 (observing how party-line judicial 
decisions threaten “the legitimacy of the election system and respect for courts and the rule 
of law”).  
 22. See generally Saul Zipkin, Administering Election Law, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 641 
(2012); Joseph A. Peters, The Meaningful Vote Commission: Restraining Gerrymanders with 
a Federal Agency, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1051 (2010); Note, A Federal Administrative Ap-
proach to Redistricting Reform, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1842 (2008). 
 23. See generally Anthony J. Gaughan, Illiberal Democracy: The Toxic Mix of Fake 
News, Hyperpolarization, and Partisan Election Administration, 12 DUKE J. CONST. L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 57 (2017) [hereinafter Gaughan, Illiberal Democracy]; Tokaji, The Future of Elec-
tion Reform, supra note 11, at 129–38; Richard L. Hasen, Beyond the Margin of Litigation: 
Reforming U.S. Election Administration to Avoid Electoral Meltdown, 62 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 937, 944 (2005) [hereinafter Hasen, Beyond the Margin]. 
 24. See, e.g., Tokaji, The Future of Election Reform, supra note 11, at 146 (cautioning 
that “[t]here exists no federal administrative agency that can be trusted to implement new 
federal mandates, and it is far from clear that one can be created in the foreseeable future”); 
see also Hasen, Beyond the Margin, supra note 23, at 973–91 (proposing creation of “cadre” 
of election professionals at the state level). 
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overseeing election administration.”25 Intervening events—including 
the Supreme Court’s reaffirmation of Congress’s paramount federal 
election authority,26 Shelby County, the 2016 election, and the intro-
duction and passage of H.R. 1—suggest both the appeal of and legisla-
tive interest in increased federal election administration. Accordingly, 
this Article details such an agency’s historical antecedents, its consti-
tutionality, and its potential structure and powers. 
In short, this Article advances institution-based proposals to cen-
tralize federal election administration, and, drawing upon historical 
lessons, create a robust system of federal election oversight. In doing 
so, the federal election administration agency would dramatically cut 
partisanship in election administration. Moreover, citizen-initiated 
federal election oversight would rectify some of the blows Shelby 
County inflicted.27 As H.R. 1’s detail and scope indicate, there is no 
shortage of legislative enthusiasm for electoral reform. Legislators  
can draw from historical lessons to take additional bold action at the 
federal level.  
Part I examines the original Enforcement Acts—taking account  
of their origin, contents, and operations—and evaluates their effective-
ness. Part II describes Congress’s authority over federal, state, and  
local elections under the Elections Clause and several constitutional 
amendments. Part III couples the preceding historical analysis of the 
Enforcement Acts and legal, constitutional analysis of Congress’s 
broad electoral authority to offer two election administration reforms 
through a Modern Enforcement Act (“MEA”)—a nonpartisan Federal 
Election Administration Agency (“FEAA”) and citizen-initiated federal 
election oversight. 
II.   THE ENFORCEMENT ACTS OF 1870–71  
Federal marshals, deputies, and election supervisors were common 
sights at polling places throughout the South and urban North be-
tween 1870 and 1894, when Congress repealed the Enforcement 
Acts.28 Through enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment and activating 
deep powers in the Elections Clause, Congress established a complex 
federal administrative infrastructure to regulate elections for a  
generation. 
 
 25. Tokaji, The Future of Election Reform, supra note 11, at 149; see also id. at 144–49 
(comparing benefits of state-level versus federal-level election administration reforms). 
 26. Arizona v. Inter-Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 570 U.S. 1, 8–9 (2013). 
 27. See, e.g., Christopher S. Elmendorf & Douglas M. Spencer, Administering Section 2 
of the Voting Rights Act After Shelby County, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2143, 2145–46 (2015) (iden-
tifying examples of “new, restrictive voting laws” passed soon after Shelby County). 
 28. David Quigley, Constitutional Revision and the City: The Enforcement Acts and Ur-
ban America, 1870–1894, 20 J. OF POL’Y HIST. 64, 65 (2008). 
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A.   The Enforcement Acts’ Context 
Not long after the Fifteenth Amendment’s ratification in 1870,  
Mississippi Senator Hiram Revels “appeal[ed] for protection from the 
strong arm of the Government for her loyal children, irrespective of 
color and race, who are citizens of the southern States.”29 Senator John 
Sherman of Ohio urged his colleagues to fulfill their “imperative duty” 
to “pass suitable laws” to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment since nei-
ther the Fourteenth nor the Fifteenth Amendments were enforceable 
“by the simple operation of their own force.”30 Both amendments, he 
reported, were “violated repeatedly” despite being the supreme law of 
the land.31 Meanwhile, congressional Republicans sought enforcement 
measures to combat blatant election fraud in urban centers, particu-
larly New York City. As Ulysses S. Grant, the Republican candidate, 
comfortably won the state of New York (and the presidential election), 
Democratic victories in Manhattan came under suspicion of election 
fraud.32 The New York Times estimated between 50,000 and 75,000  
illegal votes were cast in New York City.33  
Responding to these concerns, Congress passed three Enforcement 
Acts between May 1870 and April 1871. The first Enforcement Act was 
officially titled “An Act to enforce the Right of Citizens of the United 
States to vote in the several States of this Union, and for other  
Purposes.”34 The detailed Senate proposal contained seventeen sec-
tions and was “far more perceptive” to voting barriers in the South  
as compared to other proposals originating from the House.35 First, it 
criminalized any interference with prerequisites for voting, declaring 
that “it shall be the duty of every such person and officer to give to all 
citizens of the United States the same and equal opportunity to  
perform such prerequisite, and to become qualified to vote.”36 The 
 
 29. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1987 (1870).  
 30. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3568 (1870).  
 31. Id. For example, voters in Circleville, Ohio had been prevented from voting “not-
withstanding the fifteenth amendment” and sought for an enforcement law to assist in exer-
cising their rights. QUINCY DAILY WHIG, Apr. 11, 1870. 
 32. Albie Burke, Federal Regulation of Congressional Elections in Northern Cities, 
1871–1894, at 36–38 (Mar. 1968) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago) 
[hereinafter Burke, Ph.D. diss.].  
 33. N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1869. According to Albie Burke, The Nation’s estimate of 
50,000 “was the most objective and probably the most accurate.” Albie Burke, Federal Reg-
ulation of Congressional Elections in Northern Cities, 1871–94, 14 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 17, 23 
(1970) [hereinafter Burke, 14 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.]. 
 34. See Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (1870); CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 
2d Sess. 3561–62 (reprinting text of Senate bill in full). 
 35. XI WANG, THE TRIAL OF DEMOCRACY: BLACK SUFFRAGE AND NORTHERN 
REPUBLICANS, 1860–1910, at 59 (1997); see also CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3503–04 
(1870) (for text of House bill). 
 36. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3561 (1870). 
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House bill, on the other hand, only criminalized interference with the 
act of voting.37 The Senate bill, like its House counterpart, reiterated 
that citizens “shall be entitled and allowed to vote at all such elec-
tions.”38 It similarly gave original jurisdiction to the federal courts, 
while also stating that any crimes committed under the act could be 
prosecuted by grand jury indictment.39 Under the Senate version, the 
federal government gained significantly more authority over the reg-
istration and voting processes.  
Most significantly for this Article, the Senate bill provided exten-
sive enforcement machinery to the federal government. It gave district 
attorneys, federal marshals, and deputy marshals the power to arrest 
and imprison any violators of the law. In fact, the bill required federal 
officers to “institute proceedings against all and every person” who  
violated the act and mandated federal courts to, as necessary, “in-
crease the number of commissioners, so as to afford a speedy and  
convenient means for the arrest and examination” of the act’s viola-
tors.40 The act afforded steep, $1,000 fines for federal officers who  
refused their duties. It empowered them to “summon and call to their 
aid the bystanders or posse comitatus” to “insure a faithful observance 
of the fifteenth amendment.”41 The bill also permitted the president to 
use the land, naval, or militia forces “as shall be deemed necessary” to 
enforce the law.42  
There was little doubt that the bill would pass. At the time of its 
passage, the Republicans commanded lopsided majorities in the House 
and Senate.43 After a lengthy debate that lasted early into the morning 
of May 21, 1870, the Senate passed the legislation.44 According to one 
senator, the bill supported the intent of the Fifteenth Amendment: “to 
secure to the colored man, and to the white man also, having the right 
to vote, the opportunity to go to the polls and quietly deposit his vote.”45 
On May 31, 1870, President Grant approved the legislation and it  
became law.46 
 
 37. Id. at 3504.  
 38. Id. at 3479 (emphasis added). 
 39. Id. at 3480. 
 40. Id.  
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 3562. 
 43. Historian Xi Wang calculates that at the time the measures were debated during 
the second session of the 41st Congress, there were sixty-one Republican senators, nine Dem-
ocrat senators, and two senators of the Conservative Party. “[I]n the House, Republicans 
outnumbered the sixty-four Democrats by nearly a hundred.” WANG, supra note 35, at 57. 
 44. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3690 (1870). The vote was forty-three in favor, 
eight against, and twenty-one abstaining. Only one Republican voted against the bill. Id. 
 45. Id. at 3655. 
 46. WANG, supra note 35, at 65. 
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Congressional Republicans sought to strengthen the first Enforce-
ment Act after Democratic electoral victories in 1870].47 The second 
Enforcement Act amended the first Enforcement Act and became law 
on February 28, 1871.48 What became the second Enforcement Act 
added 19 sections to the first act and “obviously targeted the states’ 
power to regulate elections.”49  
The third Enforcement Act—known as the Ku Klux Klan Act—
passed in April 1871.50 The Ku Klux Klan Act criminalized conspira-
cies to violate federal laws, as well as nefarious actions that aimed to 
prevent individuals from exercising their civil rights, by use of “force, 
intimidation, or threat[s].” 51 A major purpose of the Act was to outlaw 
the Ku Klux Klan and other terrorist groups that worked to deprive 
individuals of rights guaranteed by the Reconstruction Amendments 
and the 1866 Civil Rights Act.52 According to one historian, the prose-
cutions that followed the act “had broken the back” of the Klan by 
1872.53 
B.   The Enforcement Acts’ Provisions 
The three Enforcement Acts were the nation’s first robust federal 
election laws, and expanded federal power to an unprecedented de-
gree. The first Act focused primarily on African American voters in the 
South.54 Throughout its 23 sections, the law defined voting-related 
crimes—chiefly aimed at combatting voter intimidation tactics that 
Southern whites had adopted. The Act required election officers to give 
“the same and equal opportunity” for any individual to perform any 
voting-related prerequisites, or face stiff fines or possible jail time.55 It 
criminalized any acts “by force, bribery, threats, intimidation, or other 
unlawful means” to “hinder, delay, prevent, or obstruct” voting.56 It 
prohibited employers, landlords, or contractors from preventing voting 
through threats of termination, ejection, or refusals to renew leases or 
contracts.57 In an especially broad measure, the Act barred two or more  
 
 
 47. Id. at 78–80. 
 48. Id. at 82. 
 49. Id. at 81. 
 50. Id. at 83. 
 51. Act of April 20, 1871, § 2, 17 Stat. 13. 
 52. WANG, supra note 35, at 83. 
 53. ROBERT M. GOLDMAN, “A FREE BALLOT AND A FAIR COUNT”: THE DEPARTMENT OF 
JUSTICE AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF VOTING RIGHTS IN THE SOUTH, 1877–1893 9 (2001).  
 54. See WANG, supra note 35, at 65 (“[T]he focus was on black suffrage.”). 
 55. Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, § § 2, 3, 16 Stat. 140, 140–41 (1870).  
 56. § 4, 16 Stat. at 141.  
 57. § 5, 16 Stat. at 141.  
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people from conspiring “or go[ing] in disguise upon the public highway 
. . . with intent to violate any provision of this act, or to injure, oppress, 
threaten, or intimidate” anyone from voting.58 
Other sections detailed enforcement mechanisms. Federal courts 
had original jurisdiction for any violations of the Act.59 Federal courts 
also had the ability to increase the number of election supervisors to 
“afford a speedy and convenient” manner for charging the law’s viola-
tors.60 The Act granted specific causes of action for allegedly defeated 
candidates to sue in federal court “by reason of the denial to any citizen 
. . . of the right to vote.”61 District attorneys, marshals, and deputy 
marshals had “powers of arresting, imprisoning, or bailing offend-
ers;”62 marshals and deputy marshals were also required to “obey and 
execute all warrants and precepts” issued against the law’s offenders.63 
Perhaps most controversially, the president of the United States could 
deploy any land, naval, or militia forces as “necessary to aid in the 
execution of judicial process[es]” the law laid out.64 
The first Act also addressed election fraud common in urban areas. 
For instance, the Act criminalized anyone knowingly registering or at-
tempting to register “in the name of any other person, whether living, 
dead, or fictitious,” or bribing, threatening, or compelling any such 
fraudulent registration.65 The law also detailed numerous crimes  
that election officers could be prosecuted for if they, among other 
things, violated any duties, took bribes, falsely reported election  
totals, or aided any voter in committing voter fraud.66 Violating these 
sections would result in a $500 maximum penalty or a prison term  
of no greater than three years, or both, in addition to paying the costs 
of prosecution.67 
Building on the first Act, the second Enforcement Act made enforce-
ment processes more complex by “providing technical details regarding 
enforcement machinery.”68 Two citizens in a city with a population of 
at least 20,000 inhabitants could petition a federal judge to appoint 
two election supervisors in a given precinct.69 The judge could then  
appoint the two supervisors—one from each party—to oversee these 
 
 58. § 6, 16 Stat. at 141.  
 59. § 8, 16 Stat. at 142.  
 60. § 9, 16 Stat. at 142.  
 61. § 23, 16 Stat. at 146.  
 62. § 9, 16 Stat. at 142. 
 63. § 10, 16 Stat. at 142. 
 64. § 13, 16 Stat. at 143. 
 65. § 20, 16 Stat. at 145. 
 66. § 22, 16 Stat. 145–46. 
 67. § 19, 16 Stat. at 144–45. 
 68. WANG, supra note 35, at 80. 
 69. Id.; see also Act of February 28, 1871, § 2, ch. 99, § 2, 16 Stat. 433 (1871). 
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elections.70 The two requesting citizens could also request certain pa-
rameters for federal supervision.71 For example, they could request su-
pervision only for specific parts of a given city or for supervision only 
on Election Day.72  
Chief election supervisors were required to “discharge the duties in 
this act” in a “faithful and capable” manner.73 These duties included a 
wide range of managerial tasks—for example, to provide materials 
such as  lists of potential voters and registrations to election supervi-
sors in the district to ensure such voters’ veracity and to “receive,  
preserve, and file all oaths of office” of election supervisors and deputy 
marshals.74 The chiefs’ subordinates, termed “supervisors of election,” 
also had important responsibilities. They were to “attend at all times 
and places for holding elections of representatives or delegates in  
Congress,” to count the votes, to challenge any vote that they doubt, 
“to be and remain where the ballot-boxes are kept at all times after the 
polls are open” and the count completed, and to “personally inspect and 
scrutinize . . . the manner in which the voting is done.”75 The supervi-
sors also had extensive regulatory power over the registration process. 
One provision required them to attend “at all times and places fixed 
for the registration of voters” and to ensure the process was running 
smoothly by “personally inspect[ing] and scrutiniz[ing]” the registry 
and voter lists.76 The federal law also specified the supervisors’ physi-
cal placement in polling and registration places. They were to be  
present as to “best enable them or him to see each person offering  
himself for registration” or voting.77 The Act further detailed the  
penalties and punishments should election supervisors neglect their 
duties, or any individual interfere with the Act’s provisions.78 
C.   The Enforcement Acts in Action 
The first Enforcement Act’s implementation began during the 1870 
elections. U.S. attorneys initiated the bulk of enforcement activities 
through the newly created Department of Justice and, accordingly, the 
 
 70. § 2, 16 Stat. at 433–34. 
 71. Burke, Ph.D. diss., supra note 31, at 167–68. 
 72. Id. at 4. 
 73. § 13, 16 Stat. at 437–38. 
 74. Id. 
 75. § 5, 16 Stat. at 434–35. 
 76. § 4, 16 Stat. at 434. 
 77. § 6, 16 Stat. at 435. 
 78. §§ 7, 9, 10, 11, 16 Stat. at 435–37.  
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prosecutions ended up in federal court.79 In 1870, federal prosecutors 
brought forty-three cases under the Act, resulting in thirty-two convic-
tions.80 They had a one-hundred percent success rate in the Northern 
states and seventy-four percent success rate nationally, although no 
alleged violator in the Southern states was convicted.81 The next year, 
prosecutors brought 314 cases and convicted 128 violators of the Acts, 
108 of whom were in Southern states.82 Prosecutions peaked in 1873 
with 1,304 cases brought in federal courts, though only thirty-six per-
cent—469 violators total—were convicted.83 After 1873, the number of 
prosecutions declined.84 Even so, some districts remained active sites 
for election law prosecutions. Northern Mississippi was the site of 
1,072 prosecutions between 1871 and 1884—more than any other  
region—and accounted for approximately one-third of all Enforcement 
Act convictions during these years.85 More than half of the cases there 
resulted in convictions, compared to a twenty-eight percent success 
rate nationally.86  
The disenfranchisement of African American voters in Delaware  
illustrates the laws’ operation. There, Democratic officials prevented  
African Americans from paying the then-legal poll taxes to qualify as 
voters.87 On Election Day 1872, mobs across the state physically 
blocked African Americans from voting, beat them, and, in two locali-
ties, drove federal deputy marshals from the scene.88 A Democratic 
landslide victory followed.89 Federal officials charged New Castle 
County tax collector, Archibald Given, for failing to qualify voting  
prerequisites impartially as required by the second section of the first 
Enforcement Act.90 He was found guilty in the trial court and appealed, 
challenging the section’s constitutionality.91 
 
 79. WANG, supra note 35, at 96 (“But from the vantage point of enforcement, this new 
addition to the federal government helped institutionalize enforcement of the Fourteenth 
and Fifteenth Amendment in the early 1870s.”). 
 80. WILLIAM GILLETTE, RETREAT FROM RECONSTRUCTION, 1869–1879 43 (1979). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Stephen Cresswell, Enforcing the Enforcement Acts: The Department of Justice in 
Northern Mississippi, 1870–1890, 53 J. S. HIST. 421, 422 (1987). 
 86. Id. According to Cresswell’s tallies, only 1,529 out of 5,386 prosecutions nation-wide 
resulted in convictions. However, 585 out of the 1,529 convictions were from Northern  
Mississippi, a stunning fifty-five percent success rate. Id. 
 87. GILLETTE, supra note 80, at 38. 
 88. Id. at 38–39. 
 89. Id. at 39 (“Without their black support, the Republicans had been robbed of vic-
tory.”). 
 90. United States v. Given, 25 F. Cas. 1324, 1327 (C.C.D. Del. 1873) (No. 15,210). 
 91. Id. at 1324. 
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In United States v. Given, U.S. Supreme Court Justice William 
Strong (writing for the lower federal court) explained that Given’s  
tax-collecting duties were clearly outlined in Delaware’s statute.92 By 
failing to collect the taxes from African Americans, Given breached his 
duty. Because this breach occurred over a racially discriminatory  
purpose, Strong had “no doubt” that Given was liable under the  
Enforcement Act.93 Justice Strong admitted that the Enforcement  
Acts had been met with “great disfavor” from “many quarters,” partic-
ularly private individuals and minor officers like Given.94 He observed, 
however, Congress’s remedy for state officials’ inaction was the En-
forcement Acts—evidence of Congress’s intent not to leave voting 
rights “without full and adequate protection.”95 Echoing other courts 
of the 1870s, Strong upheld the constitutionality of the Enforcement 
Act’s second section. The Fifteenth Amendment “expressly conferred 
upon congress to enforce” the right to vote and therefore “must be  
so construed as to confer some effective power.”96 Before 1876, every 
court that received challenges to the Enforcement Acts upheld their 
constitutionality.97 
In total, between 1870 and 1877, federal prosecutors charged  
3,384 individuals in the South with violating the Enforcement Acts, 
convicting 1,143.98 But by 1874, the Enforcement Acts’ focus turned 
northward.99 This pivot represented a shift from the “protection of 
black suffrage to the purity of the northern ballot.”100 The February 
1871 Enforcement Act targeted only cities with populations greater 
than 20,000, which, as historian William Gillette observed, were 
largely in the North.101  
 
 92. Id. at 1327. 
 93. Id. at 1327–28.  
 94. Id. at 1327. 
 95. Id. (stating that although Delaware did not actively discriminate against black vot-
ers but rather “neglect[ed] to impose penalties upon its election officers for making discrim-
inations on account of race or color” the federal government may get involved—“I think such 
intervention was contemplated and expressly authorized”). 
 96. Id. at 1326. 
 97. WANG, supra note 35, at 120 (“[F]ederal district and circuit judges universally up-
held the constitutionality of the enforcement laws”). 
 98. GILLETTE, supra note 81, at 43. 
 99. See id. at 49 (“[T]he bulk of enforcement expenditures had been made in the North, 
not the South.”) “In truth, earlier federal election enforcement had become increasingly in-
effective and irrelevant as far as Negro voting in the South was concerned.” Id. at 355. 
 100. Scott C. James & Brian L. Lawson, The Political Economy of Voting Rights Enforce-
ment in America’s Gilded Age: Electoral College Competition, Partisan Commitment, and the 
Federal Election Law, 93 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 115, 115 (1999). 
 101. GILLETTE, supra note 80, at 48–49 (“Since real power under enforcement was 
granted only to election supervisors in cities with a population of twenty thousand, and since 
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Starting in the 1872 elections, federal election supervisors and  
marshals were ubiquitous in New York City, Brooklyn, Jersey City, 
Baltimore, Philadelphia, and San Francisco. In 1876, Chicago and  
Boston joined the list of regulated cities.102 Through the 1880s and into 
the 1890s, the number of federal supervisors increased, peaking in 
1892.103 For the average voter in Manhattan or any urban precinct  
during this era, “the state was most abundantly visible—in the form 
of armed, uniformed United States deputy marshals—every two years 
on Election Day.”104 
As outlined in the Enforcement Act provisions, any two (or more) 
citizens could request election supervisors in their precinct by petition-
ing a federal judge. A typical request was succinct. An 1878 petition 
from Philadelphia, for example, identified the two citizens, their home 
election district, their desire “to have said registration or election  
[in said district] both guarded and scrutinized,” and their request for 
“the appointment of two supervisors in each election division of said 
Congressional district.”105  
The supervisors were chosen from lists of individuals provided  
by the political parties, subject to approval by the federal judge who 
received the petition and the chief election supervisor.106 Approval  
was not automatic. The New York City chief election supervisor, John 
Davenport, recounted in 1876 that federal judge Lewis Woodruff 
opined that local political organizations— “indorsed by the chairmen 
of the State or State and national committees”—should present the 
 
all but five of those sixty-eight cities were in the northern and border states, the political 
intent and practical effects were obvious.”). 
 102. Burke, Ph.D. diss., supra note 31, at 25. 
 103. Id. at 26. 
 104. David Quigley, Constitutional Revision and the City: The Enforcement Acts and  
Urban America, 1870–1894, 20 J. OF POL’Y HIST. 64, 65 (2008).  
 105. WANG, supra note 35, at 292. In full, the petition read: 
  To the honorable William McKennan, judge of the United States circuit court 
for the eastern district of Pennsylvania: The petition of John Keegen and John 
McCauley respectfully represents: That they are citizens of the city of Philadel-
phia and reside in the third Congressional district of the State of Pennsylvania, 
within the eastern district of Pennsylvania; that they do hereby make known to 
your honor their desire to have the registration and election in said district 
guarded and scrutinized, and for that purpose they ask for the appointment of 
two supervisors in each election division of said Congressional district, to guard 
and scrutinize the registration of voters to be made in said election divisions on 
the third day of June next, and the election that takes place in said district for 
Representative in the Congress of the United States on the fifth day of November 
next. And they will ever pray & c. 
John Keegen 
John McCauley 
S. REP. No. 916, at 18–19 (1881). 
 106. Burke, Ph.D. diss., supra note 31, at 169. 
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lists of potential supervisors.107 Davenport rejected more than one  
hundred names from each parties’ list—an action the judge recog-
nized—allowing the parties to “send in other names in their stead, 
which they did.”108 The New York Times reported that members on the 
Democratic list, who were supporters of the Tammany Hall machine, 
were rejected for “incapacity, moral unfitness and inability to read  
the English language.”109  
Literacy was certainly an important qualification. The duties of the 
supervisors and their chiefs involved meticulous recordkeeping. In 
New York City, supervisors would be present at each registration site. 
In 1872, there were 569 election districts with approximately 1,138  
total election supervisors.110 Every day during the registration period, 
both the Democratic and Republican supervisors sent the registry to 
Davenport.111 The books contained detailed information about each 
voter, including his address, party, race, time of residence, his natu-
ralization status, his election districts, and whether he was a qualified 
voter.112 Davenport explained in a congressional hearing, “[t]hose 
books are compared so that I may be able to know whether they agree 
and whether the same number of names are contained in the one book 
that are found in the other.”113 “A force of clerks [were] put at once at 
work upon the books” late into the evening hours to compare them;  
any discrepancy higher than a “mere technical” one would result  
immediately in the supervisor’s removal.114 
While election supervisors were judicially appointed, the executive 
branch appointed marshals. Marshals and election supervisors “were 
under no statutory compulsion to work together in a coordinated  
effort.”115 A marshal served as an official law enforcement officer and 
could appoint deputy marshals without running through the citizen-
petition process.116 Marshals generally worked to keep the peace  
during the registration period and on election day.117 They also checked 
the registration books and, ideally, worked in conjunction with the 
 
 107. H.R. REP. No. 44–218, at 34 (1877) 
 108. Id. 
 109. Burke, Ph.D. diss., supra note 31, at 170. 
 110. H.R. REP. No. 44–218, at 2 (1877) (“[I]n the whole five hundred and sixty-nine elec-
toral districts two supervisors of different parties were on hand to supervise the registry and 
aid the local or State officials.”). 
 111. Id. at 37. 
 112. Id. at 34. 
 113. Id.  
 114. Id. at 36–37. 
 115. Burke, Ph.D. diss., supra note 31, at 173. 
 116. Id. at 170 (“The final judgment rested with him.”). 
 117. H.R. REP. No. 44–218, at 15 (1877). 
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election supervisors.118The chief election supervisor in Massachusetts, 
Henry L. Hallett, testified before Congress that when he and a  
marshal disagreed, it ended when the marshal “acquiesced in my con-
struction of the law.”119 If they had not agreed, “I had no power to do 
anything in the matter.”120 Hallett suggested that a single responsible 
individual ought to have been “at the head of the whole machinery.”121  
U.S. marshals and deputy marshals were more prone to partisan 
bias because of their executive appointment status. One Democratic 
election supervisor testified before the Senate that the Republican- 
appointed federal marshal at his Philadelphia district was drunk on 
election day and combative toward Democrats.122 “He was insulting 
voters all day,” R.C. Howell described.123 The marshal told Democratic 
voters to put their proof of voting, a tax receipt, back in their pockets 
and, on one occasion grabbed a voter, pulled him away from the polling 
place, and threatened to arrest him.124 New York City supervisor  
Davenport testified that he strongly preferred election supervisors 
over marshals “for the reason that they are generally men of greater 
intelligence . . . [t]heir handwriting and spelling is better and they are 
more particular about the examination of the names.”125 Continuing, 
that “[i]n other words, they understand the importance and delicacy of 
the work better than the marshals.” 126 Additionally, marshals were 
not explicitly required under the law to be literate whereas supervisors 
were required to be able to read and write in English. 
Of course, not all of the federal supervisors and marshals were 
drunken partisans picking fights with voters. On the contrary, they 
were generally successful in combatting rampant fraud like repeat  
voting, ballot-box stuffing, and registration inconsistencies. Davenport 
and his team in New York City methodically created registration lists 
that involved four primary stages of preparation. First, the federal  
officials had detailed maps of the city that were corrected every thirty 
days, which made known “[a]ll the doubtful or suspected or bad 
houses” of possible voter registration violators.127 Second, they created 
“block books” that contained all the voters on a particular block.128 
 
 118. Id. at 14–15. 
 119. S. REP. No. 46–497, pt. 5, at 27 (1880) (testimony of Henry Hallett). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. S. REP. No. 46–916, pt. 2, at 27–28. (1881). 
 123. Id. at 23. 
 124. Id. at 23-24. Another party recounted that the drunken marshal “said he wanted to 
cut that big bugger––to cut the son of a bitch’s guts out.” Id. at 28. 
 125. H.R. Rep. No. 44–218, at 37 (1877). 
 126. Id.  
 127. 46 CONG. REC. H823 (1879).  
 128. Burke, Ph.D. diss., supra note 31, at 181. 
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Third, the names from these block books were alphabetically sorted 
into a final list of registrants for the city, containing not just a voter’s 
address but his party, naturalization status, the court that naturalized 
him, and other pertinent information.129 The fourth stage involved 
crosschecking a voter’s information against the existing registry.130 
Davenport’s scrupulous efforts were undoubtedly successful in com-
batting registration fraud, though they resulted in predictable parti-
san ire against him.131 
Even more, federal election regulation was costly. One scholar esti-
mated the regulatory programs cost more than $4.6 million between 
1871 and 1894.132 In New York City, for example, the federal program 
incurred significant expenses between staff salaries, supplies, office 
rentals, and general expenses. Enforcement-related expenses did not 
fall equally between the parties. In one able analysis, political scien-
tists Scott C. James and Brian L. Lawson concluded that discretionary 
federal election enforcement expenditures generally benefitted Repub-
lican candidates. 133 Expenditures for the judicially appointed election 
supervisors were roughly comparable in Democratic New York and Re-
publican Pennsylvania.134 There was wide divergence, however, in re-
gional expenses for the marshals, who were appointed by the more 
partisan executive branch: roughly $28 per thousand people in New 
York versus $3.52 per thousand people in Pennsylvania.135 
D.   Evaluating the Enforcement Acts 
Congress repealed the Enforcement Acts in 1894 along a party-line 
vote.136 Democrats supported the laws’ repeal, believing they were  
unconstitutional extensions of federal power—a contrast with then- 
recent Supreme Court opinions.137 A committee report by the repeal 
effort’s primary sponsor reasoned that the Elections Clause placed  
primary authority for election regulation with the states. Congress had 
ultimate authority, he conceded, but the nation’s history and tradition 
 
 129. Id. at 181–82. 
 130. Id. 
 131. See id. 
 132. Burke, 14 AM. J. LEGAL HIST., supra note 33, at 27. In 2018 dollars, $4.6 million in 
1894 was approximately $134 million. 
 133. James & Lawson, supra note 100, at 120. 
 134. Id. at 121. 
 135. Id. at 120. 
 136. The repeal bill passed the Senate 39 to 28 and the House 201 to 102. See WANG, 
supra note 35, at 254–59 (detailing the procedures and oratory of politicians for and against 
repeal). 
 137. See infra notes 218 to 231 and accompanying text (discussing Siebold and Yar-
brough decisions); see also WANG, supra note 35, at 244 & 253 (discussing Democratic sup-
port for repeal and belief that laws violated the Constitution). 
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limited congressional authority to only certain circumstances.138 Such 
a view permeated national memory of the laws almost immediately. 
The New York Times editorialized that the Acts were:  
[I]n no sense employed as a means of purifying the suffrage or 
protecting the rights of voters or repressing and punishing offenses 
against the suffrage, but that, on the contrary, [they] degenerated 
into a device for supplying patronage to the party in power and to 
some extent for annoying and intimidating the opposing party.139  
From the outset, then, it is difficult to evaluate the Enforcement 
Acts without considering their fierce partisan valance.  
The Acts existed during a still nascent federal administrative 
state.140 Political scientist Stephen Skowronek has characterized the 
nineteenth century administrative state as a “patchwork” system.141 
While steamship travel, trade with Native American tribes, the Post 
Office, and the Fugitive Slave Act offered complex federal laws and 
regulations, national regulations were “quite limited” when compared 
to state and local regulations.142 In policy areas regulated by the fed-
eral government, administration was developing, expanding, and “be-
coming more professionalized.”143 At the same time, the responsibili-
ties of the federal courts were growing. According to Skowronek, the 
judiciary’s dockets were “stretched to their limits” as the courts’ juris-
dictions expanded and judges “assume[d] the role of stern policeman 
for the new national economy.”144  
Tucked into the ever-increasing numbers of federal regulations, de-
veloping administrative agencies, and expanding federal jurisdiction, 
were the Enforcement Acts and accompanying administrative as-
pects—including legal and administrative problems. The section below 
discusses each of these two realms of problems. 
1. The Enforcement Acts’ Problems of Law 
First, questions swirled around the Enforcement Acts’ constitution-
ality soon after their implementation. The Acts’ legal limitations were 
unclear since they were often enforced piecemeal. In some respects, 
 
 138. See H.R. Rep. No. 53–18, at 2–6 (1893) (analyzing the Elections Clause’s text and 
its interpreted primary grant of power to the states).  
 139. The Close of a Chapter, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1894, at 4. 
 140. Legal scholar Jerry Mashaw has meticulously refuted the notion that administra-
tive law developed out of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 and explored the pre-twenti-
eth century versions of administrative law. Jerry L. Mashaw, Federal Administration and 
Administrative Law in the Gilded Age, 119 YALE L.J. 1362, 1366 n.9 (2010).  
 141. STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF 
NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877–1920, at 37 (1982).  
 142. Mashaw, supra note 140, at 1380. 
 143. Id. at 1461. 
 144. SKOWRONEK, supra note 141, at 41. 
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the laws did not go far enough in combatting racial discrimination  
in the South but still were thought of as “exceed[ing] the prevailing 
constitutional norms by circumscribing state authority.”145 As a result, 
federal prosecutors were instructed to act cautiously in this new ex-
tension of federal power. One of President Grant’s Attorneys General, 
Amos Akerman, warned his subordinates to execute their responsibil-
ities carefully by acting “in no unnecessary harshness” and “in a decent 
and gentlemanly manner.”146 
Second, the Acts’ rapid passage resulted in overambitious, expan-
sive, and unclear language. Historian William Gillette speculated that 
Republicans quickly passed the Acts “expecting [they] would somehow 
enforce [themselves].”147 To their detriment, he argued, “certain ends 
had been encouraged without marshaling the necessary means.”148 
Specifically, the laws gave extensive powers to federal courts, which 
applied those powers inconsistently across the country. The laws also 
left relatively unclear “under what circumstances federal jurisdiction 
applied to private individuals.”149 The Acts’ lack of clarity presented 
difficulties for legislators as well. Republican Senator George  
Williams, for example, described the first Enforcement Act as a “con-
glomerated mass of incongruities and uncertainties” and a “sort of 
moral essay that has been thrown into something like the shape of 
legislation.”150  
Third, the Acts imposed geographic limitations on their reach. 
While ostensibly enacted to combat voter suppression in the South,  
the disproportionate focus on Northern cities often came at the ex-
pense of any federal regulation in, say, the rural North or West.151 The 
provisions that extended enforcement to cities with populations 
greater than 20,000 applied almost exclusively to urban areas in  
the North and the border states.152 Admittedly, these boundaries were 
 
 145. GILLETTE, supra note 80, at 34. 
 146. WANG, supra note 35, at 96, 101 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 147. GILLETTE, supra note 80, at 45. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 34. 
 150. CONG. GLOBE 41st Cong., 2d Sess., 3656 (1870). 
 151. GILLETTE, supra note 80, at 49 (“In contrast, federal election officials serving in 
rural areas had not received any compensation and had lacked the power to arrest.”). 
 152. Zachary Newkirk, Unequal State Sovereignty: Considering the Equal State Sover-
eignty Principle Through Nineteenth-Century Election Laws, U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE (2019), 
https://lawreviewblog.uchicago.edu/2019/06/06/unequal-state-sovereignty-considering-the-
equal-state-sovereignty-principle-through-nineteenth-century-election-laws-by-zachary-
newkirk%E2%80%A0/ [https://perma.cc/SK28-U8G3] (“New York and Massachusetts each 
had ten cities that met this [20,000 population] threshold, Pennsylvania had seven, New 
Jersey had six, and Ohio had five. Meanwhile, among non-Southern states, Iowa, Minnesota, 
Wisconsin, Maine, and New Hampshire only had one city that met this threshold while  
Vermont, Oregon, Nevada, Kansas, Nebraska, and West Virginia had none.”) 
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self-imposed by the Republicans, undoubtedly for partisan benefit.153 
Nevertheless, they resulted in a slow decline in enforcement in the 
Southern states.154  
Fourth, the Enforcement Acts addressed discrimination at the polls 
but did not combat less blatant forms of discrimination that became 
more notorious in later decades. Through the 1870s, conservative 
Democrats in Virginia implemented gerrymandering schemes in cities, 
instituted poll taxes, and disenfranchised African Americans for petit 
larceny and other minor crimes.155 Tennessee’s 1870 Constitution, 
meanwhile, required voters to pay a poll tax and provide proof of  
payment.156 North Carolina followed suit six years later.157 Georgia  
already had a poll tax implemented by statute in 1866 and added  
to the state constitution in 1868.158 Delaware’s poll tax followed its 
Democratic Party’s statement that their state was not “morally bound” 
to the Reconstruction Amendments, a position, historian Eric Foner 
notes, that suggested a return to slavery.159 Maryland’s constitution 
reallocated legislative representation to favor rural white regions over 
largely African American Baltimore.160  
Finally, federal courts arguably undermined the Enforcement Acts 
just as they were succeeding in the South.161 Early federal court  
decisions in the lower courts were unanimously favorable to the En-
forcement Acts.162 But, as substantive challenges to the statutes made 
 
 153. GILLETTE, supra note 80, at 48 (noting that Republicans sought “to enact enforce-
ment laws so as to reduce or limit the northern Democratic city vote by eliminating Demo-
cratic fraud and thus carry[] marginal states in presidential elections.”). 
 154. GOLDMAN, supra note 53, at xxv–xxix. 
 155. James T. Moore, Black Militancy in Readjuster Virginia, 1879–1883, 41 J. S. HIST. 
167, 168–69 (1975) 
 156. ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF 
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 335 (2000) (listing states that imposed taxpaying re-
quirements between 1870 and 1921) 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 334–35 (listing states that imposed taxpaying requirements between 1870 
and 1921).  
 159. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863–1877 
422 (1988). 
 160. Id. 
 161. ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE 
FEDERAL COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866–1876 xiii-xiv (2004) 
(Supreme Court decisions “were made at the very moment when federal officers believed 
they were winning their struggle against Southern terrorism.”). 
 162. See WANG, supra note 35, at 120 (“[B]efore the Supreme Court’s decisions on Reese 
and Cruikshank in 1876, federal district and circuit judges universally upheld the constitu-
tionality of the enforcement laws, especially the first enforcement act.”); Burke, Ph.D. diss., 
supra note 30, at 156 (“In court encounters, both at the lower and the appellate levels, [the 
federal election laws’] terms and its constitutionality were not only sustained but sustained 
broadly.”); see also supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text (discussing United States v. 
Given, 25 F.Cas. 1324 (C.C.D. Del. 1873)). 
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their way through the appellate courts, enforcement declined due to 
the laws’ uncertain future, exacerbated by the Slaughterhouse Cases, 
which severely constrained the Fourteenth Amendment’s “privileges 
and immunities” language.163 Then-Attorney General George Williams 
wrote to district attorneys in 1875 that “criminal prosecution[s] under 
these [Enforcement A]cts ought to be suspended until it is known 
whether the Supreme Court will hold them constitutional or  
otherwise.”164  
Even while the Enforcement Acts largely survived constitutional 
challenges in Reese and Cruikshank in 1876,165 the Supreme Court’s 
decisions brought the laws “under a shadow.”166 Historian Everette 
Swinney may have exaggerated when he claimed that Reese and 
Cruikshank ended the federal government’s enforcement of the Fif-
teenth Amendment,167 but there is plentiful data indicating enforce-
ment was declining by 1876 and continued on a downward trajectory—
at least in the Southern states.168 In 1874, for example, federal prose-
cutors brought 793 election violations from Southern states into fed-
eral court.169 The next year, as the Supreme Court deliberated over 
Reese and Cruikshank, prosecutors brought 205 cases.170 In 1876, as 
Reconstruction was coming to an end, federal attorneys only brought 
106 cases from Southern states, which resulted in just two convic-
tions.171 Enforcement measures never entirely dissipated, though they 
never again reached pre-Reese and Cruikshank levels.172 
  
 
 163. KACZOROWSKI, supra note 161, at 173 (“While the Slaughterhouse decision was gen-
erally perceived as a revitalization of states rights and a corresponding diminution in na-
tional authority, it left unanswered many questions relating to national civil rights enforce-
ment authority.”); see generally Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873). 
 164. Everette Swinney, Enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment, 1870–1877, 28 J. S. HIST. 
202, 208 (1962) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 165. See infra text accompanying notes 273–277 (discussing contours of Reese and Cruik-
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2. The Enforcement Acts’ Problems of Administration 
An array of administrative problems hampered the Enforcement 
Acts’ effectiveness, even while the Acts survived constitutional  
challenges. First, federal election supervisors of less-than-stellar qual-
ity and motivation disadvantaged many jurisdictions. Some federal  
officials were unskilled in the complex Acts’ provisions and were  
oblivious to the indictment process.173 Others were charged with 
“[d]runkeness, arbitrary use of power, and blackmail.”174 Still, others 
were too apprehensive in the eyes of their superiors. As one Virginia 
supervisor wrote to the Attorney General in 1876, “timidity is the  
bane of Southern Republican officials.” He continued,  “[t]hey are so 
peaceable that they submit to wrong, some wink at it, to pacify their 
own every day life with the enemy.”175 Weak election regulators existed 
not from lack of trying. Attorney General Williams exhorted his  
subordinates to “delegate . . . power to none but careful and responsible 
persons” who should exhibit “prudent and fearless” qualities.176 But, 
more commonly, it was “sheer ignorance and lethargy” that damned 
federal officials to ineffectiveness.177 
The moral character of many federal election officials regularly 
came under fire. An 1874 letter to Congress claimed:  
The[] laws are regarded by the masses of the white people in the 
state as odious and oppressive….  They study and assail the weak 
points and infirmities which any officer of the United States may 
possess. If he is convivial, they “wine and dine” him; if he is more 
avaricious or impecunious than honest, they bribe him; if he is 
timid, they frighten and bully him.178  
An 1880 editorial in The Nation claimed there was proof that many 
election supervisors were men of the “worst character, who [did] the 
dirty work of ward politics–keepers of grog-shops and of houses of  
prostitution, pugilists, gamblers, and in many instances discharged 
convicts and drunkards.”179 This charge was not new in 1880. Congres-
sional Democrats gleefully cited nationwide examples of federal  
election officials’ crimes at the time of the laws’ passage.180  
 
 173. GILLETTE, supra note 80, at 31–32. 
 174. Swinney, supra note 164, at 217. 
 175. GILLETTE, supra note 80, at 32 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 176. Swinney, supra note 164, at 217 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 177. GILLETTE, supra note 80, at 32. 
 178. H. EXEC. DOC. No. 46, Memorial, Civil Rights in Alabama, 43d Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1874). 
 179. THE NATION, Apr. 8, 1880. 
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Another problem of administration was perceived—or actual— 
partisanship. Many officials obtained their positions from political  
patronage and therefore had direct stakes in the election outcomes 
they were appointed to impartially supervise.181 As The Nation  
observed, “[i]t is simply preposterous” for one party to “accept calmly 
the doctrine that elections are sure to be pure if watched by function-
aries . . . who . . . are dependent for their places on the result of the 
election.”182 While federal election regulations were still new, Grant’s 
Justice Department dissuaded any spread of partisan bickering. At-
torney General Akerman wrote, “I suggest the expediency of taking 
great care to keep the administration of the law unconnected with 
mere party feuds,” adding that both parties should be treated equally 
under the law “both for the moral and legal effect of the prosecution.”183 
His successor, George Williams, warned federal prosecutors in the 
South “‘no interference whatever with any political or party action not 
in violation of the law’ should be undertaken.”184 On the other hand, 
some federal officials were staunchly in opposition to the election  
regulation program. For example, federal marshals in Mississippi and 
Texas connived to select Democratic juries so as to thwart convictions 
under the Enforcement Acts;  one federal prosecutor in Georgia barred  
victims of the Ku Klux Klan from testifying, illustrative of another  
example of such opposition.185 
A major administrative problem facing the Acts’ implementers was 
the sheer amount of work that burdened even the most outstanding 
and uncorrupted federal election regulators. The federal programs 
rarely staffed enough men for effective administration.186 Various  
federal officers were assigned election law violations to investigate  
or prosecute on top of their regular responsibilities.187 In some jurisdic-
tions, during the height of federal enforcement activity, federal  
officials alone were working to arrest Klan members.188 The low 
 
 181. Burke, Ph.D. diss., supra note 30, at 171–73. 
 182. THE NATION, Apr. 8, 1880; see also Burke, Ph.D. diss., supra note 30, at 257 (“Over 
the years, deputy marshal appointments had gone to the faithful of the Republican party  
. . . Numerous arrests had been made, but few convictions secured—the purpose being only 
to prevent eligible electors from voting.”). 
 183. Swinney, supra note 164, at 214. 
 184. Id. at 215. 
 185. Id. at 216; see also id. at 215–16 (“Some marshals and district attorneys were either 
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 186. GOLDMAN, supra note 53, at xxviii. 
 187. WANG, supra note 35, at 100. 
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number of U.S. Army troops in some areas shifted more law enforce-
ment responsibilities to federal attorneys and marshals.189 
Moreover, when prosecutions progressed toward trials, unreliable 
witnesses and uncooperative juries obstructed them. Examples 
abound of threatened, murdered, or undependable witnesses and  
defendants. In South Carolina, a series of accused violators of the Acts 
fled the state, leading the Attorney General to conclude that “flight 
was confession.”190 Worse still was the fate of government witnesses. 
In Mississippi, for example, U.S. Attorney G. Wiley Wells sought  
federal protection after four of his witnesses were “cruelly murdered” 
following testimony in front of a grand jury.191 During the 1874  
elections in Tennessee, a group of African Americans traded shots with 
masked men. Local authorities arrested 16 black men who were then 
taken by a lynch mob from the jail, marched “to a nearby riverbank, 
and riddled them with bullets, killing five and severely wounding the 
rest.”192 The federal government attempted to try fifty-three white 
men, but African American witnesses were “ignorant and afraid  
and easily bec[a]me confused” and were “so terrified that some of them 
in tears and piteous tones besought the court to allow them to be  
excused from testifying,” wrote one federal prosecutor.193 A pervasive 
belief among many Southern whites that the Enforcement Acts were 
“not a law, but a mere legal nullity,” as one defendant in Georgia  
declared, grounded their lack of cooperation and compliance.194 
Sometimes local authorities obstructed prosecutions under the  
Enforcement Acts through a variety of questionable mechanisms. One 
tactic was simply to ignore the federal officials. A U.S. marshal in 
northern Mississippi wrote to Attorney General Alphonso Taft that 
even though he appointed 239 deputies to monitor the 1876 elections, 
their enforcement authority “was utterly ignored by local officials.”195 
Other tactics were more sinister. State and local authorities would 
prosecute federal officials on trumped-up charges of false arrest,  
assault, or even murder.196 Local authorities would also prosecute  
African Americans who served as witnesses for perjury.197 To combat  
 
 
 189. Id. at 425 (“In their correspondence with the attorney general in the early 1870s the 
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 192. GILLETTE, supra note 80, at 29. 
 193. Id. at 29–30 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 194. Swinney, supra note 164, at 208. 
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 196. Swinney, supra note 164, at 210. 
 197. Id. 
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these devices, the federal government was sometimes able to remove 
these charges to federal court, though this was an “exceedingly diffi-
cult” process.198 
The primary arbiters of these prosecutions were federal judges—
sometimes antagonistic to the laws but almost always swamped with 
heavy caseloads.199 Put simply, “there were not enough judges and  
judicial districts.”200 Prosecutions were long, dockets crowded, and 
court sessions “abbreviated and erratic.”201 For example, 472 violators 
were charged in South Carolina in 1871, with 420 indicted, but only 
five fully tried and found guilty.202 Attorney General Akerman was  
unimpressed by the federal court’s creaky machinery: “If it takes a 
court over one month to try five offenders, how long will it take to try 
four hundred, already indicted, and many hundreds more who deserve 
to be indicted?”203 As a result, Akerman instructed federal prosecutors 
to charge only conspiracy leaders under the Enforcement Acts.204 The 
Acts demanded more time from federal judges by requiring them to 
appoint federal election supervisors.205 All of these knotty issues  
led one scholar of the Acts to conclude, “[t]he administration of the 
elections law should not have been placed in the hands of the federal 
judiciary.”206 
Finally, the Department of Justice was inadequately resourced. At 
the time, the Department was still brand new, having been created in 
1870 and having a small staff.207 The 1870 Act to Establish a Depart-
ment of Justice provided the Attorney General with sweeping powers 
over federal attorneys across the country.208 The scattered federal  
attorneys and marshals were a “potential network of agencies with 
which to enforce the drastic provisions” of the Enforcement Acts.209 But 
according to Department historians, it faced struggles in supervising 
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field forces and developing a central organization.210 The Department’s 
nascence was also a barrier to effective administration. Local federal 
authorities had never answered to a single centralized agency in 
Washington; thus, attorneys general of this period spent significant 
time overcoming inefficiency and “simple inertia” from local federal 
personnel.211 William Gillette offers an unflattering image to describe 
the apparatus implementing the Enforcement Acts: “[T]he Depart-
ment of Justice, the court system, and the military establishment were 
comparable to a dinosaur—slow, cumbersome, and monumental in  
inefficiency.”212 
Overall, the Enforcement Acts targeted real problems—urban elec-
tion and voter fraud and racially motivated voter suppression. They 
were an unprecedented expansion of federal authority into election ad-
ministration. But ineffective implementation, perceptions of partisan-
ship, and reliance on the federal judiciary stymied their effective im-
plementation. 
III.   CONGRESS’S AUTHORITY IN A MODERN ENFORCEMENT ACT 
Though Congress passed the Enforcement Acts to breathe life into 
the Fifteenth Amendment, the Acts unquestionably regulated elec-
tions’ times, places, and manner—an area over which the Elections 
Clause grants Congress expansive authority.213 Congress’s direct  
authority in regulating state and local elections alone is generally  
recognized as less extensive, though Congress’s role is substantial  
under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.214 The federal  
superstructure over all elections has the potential to be far-reaching—
much more so than it is today, or even as proposed in H.R. 1. 
A.   Congress’s Authority Over Federal Elections 
Congress has vast authority over elections for its members. The 
Constitution’s Elections Clause states:  
The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and 
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legisla-
ture thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter 
such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.215 
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The Supreme Court has held in multiple decisions spanning three 
different centuries that Congress’s power over congressional elections 
is “paramount.”216 Most recently, in 2013, the Court reiterated that the 
“‘Times, Places and Manner’ of congressional elections ‘is paramount, 
and may be exercised at any time, and to any extent which it deems 
expedient.’”217 
The Supreme Court first upheld broad congressional authority to 
regulate federal elections in the states in 1879.218 In Ex parte Siebold, 
a group of Maryland election judges challenged the Enforcement Acts’ 
constitutionality after they were indicted “for the offence commonly 
known as ‘stuffing the ballot-box.’”219 Justice Bradley rejected their ar-
gument that congressional authority ended when Maryland’s election 
law was in force.220 Nevertheless, Bradley stressed the “harmonious” 
relationship that should exist between the state and federal govern-
ments.221 “There is nothing in the Constitution to forbid such co-oper-
ation,” he wrote.222 Though Bradley sang the praises of federalist coop-
eration, there was never any doubt as to the supremacy of Congress. 
“Congress may, if it sees fit, assume the entire control and regulation 
of the election of representatives.”223 
Five years later, in Ex parte Yarbrough,224 the Supreme Court again 
strongly endorsed Congress’s election regulation supremacy under the 
Elections Clause.225 A group of Klan members were indicted for beating 
an African American man to prevent him from voting.226 In responding 
to their challenge of the law, Justice Miller penned a rousing endorse-
ment of federal authority in protecting elections. “If [the federal gov-
ernment] has not this power it is left helpless before the two great nat-
ural and historical enemies of all republics, open violence and insidious 
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corruption,” the opinion began.227 The argument that Congress lacked 
this regulatory power is an “old argument often heard, often repeated, 
and in this Court never assented to.”228 It was only “through long habit 
and long years of forbearance” that Congress had not enacted substan-
tive regulations under the Elections Clause.229 In the face of blatant 
voter fraud and intimidation, Congress passed federal election laws 
pursuant to its express powers to do so.230 Justice Miller ended the 
opinion in a full-throated defense of federal authority to protect the 
franchise: 
If the government of the United States has within its constitu-
tional domain no authority to provide against these evils, if the very 
sources of power may be poisoned by corruption or controlled by vi-
olence and outrage, without legal restraint, then, indeed, is the 
country in danger, and its best powers, its highest purposes, the 
hopes which it inspires, and the love which enshrines it, are at the 
mercy of the combinations of those who respect no right but brute 
force, on the one hand, and unprincipled corruptionists on the 
other.231 
Nearly fifty years later, in Smiley v. Holm,232 the Supreme Court 
again confirmed expansive congressional authority over elections of its 
members. The Election Clause’s words are “comprehensive words” that 
“provide a complete code for congressional elections.”233 In addition to 
times and places, Congress has authority over: 
[N]otices, registration, supervision of voting, protection of voters, 
prevention of fraud and corrupt practices, counting of votes, duties 
of inspectors and canvassers, and making and publication of election 
returns; in short, to enact the numerous requirements as to proce-
dure and safeguards which experience shows are necessary in order 
to enforce the fundamental right involved. And these requirements 
would be nugatory if they did not have appropriate sanctions in the 
definition of offenses and punishments.234 
Together, this description of Congress’s “manner” power is vast and 
encompasses the most granular of election administration processes. 
Even more, in United States v. Classic,235 the Court held that Congress 
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has the power to regulate primary elections.236 It dismissed the argu-
ment that the right to vote for members of Congress is a state right. 
Justice Stone unequivocally stated that such arguments would be 
“true only in the sense that the states are authorized by the Constitu-
tion . . . to the extent that Congress has not restricted state action by 
the exercise of its powers.237 The Elections Clause, coupled with the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, “leaves to the Congress the choice of 
means by which its constitutional powers are to be carried into execu-
tion.”238 Justice William O. Douglas, dissenting on other grounds,  
described the Elections Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause 
as an “arsenal of power ample to protect Congressional elections from 
any and all forms of pollution.”239  
Reaffirmation of expansive federal authority continues into the 
twenty-first century. In Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, the 
Court struck down a state law requiring voter registrants to provide 
proof of citizenship. 240 Arizona’s regulation conflicted with a federal 
law requiring only an affidavit swearing proof of citizenship.241 Writing 
for a seven-member majority, Justice Antonin Scalia conceded that 
states’ interests in regulating congressional elections are “weighty and 
worthy of respect”—but they “terminate[] according to federal law.”242 
Indeed, the Elections Clause “necessarily displaces” some state elec-
tion regulations—such as a state law directing county recorders to  
reject the federal registration form.243 
Federal authority over presidential elections also has sound consti-
tutional footing. Under Article II, Section 1, Congress has the power 
to “determine the Time of chusing the Electors, and the Day on which 
they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same throughout 
the United States.”244 Though arguably more limited than the Elec-
tions Clause, courts have interpreted congressional authority over 
presidential elections as more than merely choosing a day and time. 
First, in Ex Parte Yarbrough, Justice Miller exhorted that the federal 
government’s election duties are to ensure that voting generally “shall 
be free from the adverse influence of force and fraud practised on its  
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agents” and that the federal government’s votes “by which its members 
of Congress and its President [are selected] . . . shall be the free votes 
of the electors.”245  
In the twentieth century, the Court continued to endorse Congress’s 
authority in regulating presidential elections. In Burroughs v. United 
States, the Supreme Court faced a challenge to the Federal Corrupt 
Practices Act’s constitutionality.246 The Act required political commit-
tees created to influence presidential elections to keep bookkeeping ac-
counts of all contributions made to the committee.247 The committee 
treasurer, in turn, would have to file contributors’ information with 
the House of Representatives’ clerk.248 The Act also imposed fines and 
jail time for violators.249 Addressing the Act’s constitutionality, the  
majority opinion recognized Congress’s important role in regulating 
presidential elections. Examining the critical office of the President 
and the “vital character” of the office to the “welfare and safety of the 
whole people,” Justice Sutherland left no doubt that Congress  
“undoubtedly” has the power to safeguard presidential elections.250 To 
do so would be “to deny to the nation in a vital particular the power of 
self protection [sic].”251 Citing extensively from Ex parte Yarbrough, 
Sutherland explained that congressional power to protect presidential 
elections was “clear” and that it was a matter of congressional prerog-
ative to legislate on those limits.252 Requiring disclosure of political 
contributions under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act fell easily 
within this prerogative.253  
The Burroughs decision addressed congressional regulation of 
third-party actors—political committees—but later decisions have re-
lied on Sutherland’s broad endorsement of congressional authority 
over presidential elections. In Buckley v. Valeo,254 the majority stated 
that Congress “has power to regulate Presidential elections and pri-
maries” and cited its precedent in Classic and Burroughs.255 Addition-
ally, the Court in Oregon v. Mitchell256 upheld minimum residency  
requirements for registration and absentee voting in presidential 
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elections that the Voting Rights Act required.257 The justices split  
on the rationale, however, and only Justice Black—relying on  
Burroughs—wrote that Congress has regulatory power over presiden-
tial elections by way of the Times, Place, and Manner Clause.258 
Lower courts have also spoken on Congress’s broad power over  
presidential elections. In Voting Rights Coalition v. Wilson,259 the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed California’s attempt 
to enjoin implementation of the National Voter Registration Act.260  
Addressing the National Voter Registration Act’s constitutionality,  
the court flatly stated that Congress’s broad power over congressional 
elections “has been extended to presidential elections.”261 The Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals, meanwhile, characterized the authority 
granted by Article II, Section I as “coextensive with that which Article 
I section 4 grants [Congress] over congressional elections.”262 
B.   Congress’s Authority Over State and Local Elections 
Several constitutional amendments have expanded Congress’s  
ability to regulate significant portions of state and local elections. The 
Fifteenth Amendment prohibits any discrimination in voting on the 
basis of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.263 Other amend-
ments prohibit voting discrimination on the basis of sex,264 age,265 or 
payment of taxes.266 Under the Fourteenth Amendment, a state shall 
not “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws.”267 
 
 257. Id. at 118–19. 
 258. Id. at 124. Reasoning that: 
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One arguably recent limitation on congressional authority over 
state and local elections is the equal state sovereignty principle, which 
“requires a showing that a statute’s disparate geographic coverage is 
sufficiently related to the problem that it targets.”268 Thus, any  
geographic variation in a federal law’s application presumably would 
be scrutinized to determine “sufficient relation” to the voting ills it  
targets. However, when Congress passed the first federal election laws 
in 1870-71, the equal state sovereignty doctrine was evidently not on 
the minds of the legislators nor on those of the judges reviewing those 
laws. Instead, when the federal judiciary first scrutinized the Enforce-
ment Acts’ parameters in the nineteenth century, the focus was on  
federalism.269 These nineteenth century federal court decisions both 
determined these laws’ constitutionality and helped shape the param-
eters of federal supervisory authority over state and local elections. 
The earliest cases unanimously upheld the Enforcement Acts’  
constitutionality, with two exceptions.270 In United States v. Reese, the 
Supreme Court invalidated two provisions of the first Enforcement Act 
for vagueness.271 Chief Justice Waite explained how the Fifteenth 
Amendment granted only the right for citizens to be free from discrim-
ination in voting.272 In reading the statute’s words, he wrote, “we find 
there no words of limitation, or reference even, that can be construed 
as manifesting any intention to confine its provisions to the terms of 
the Fifteenth Amendment.”273 The sections, then, were too broad to be 
“appropriate legislation” under Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment. 
Meanwhile, in United States v. Cruikshank, the Court reversed the 
convictions of defendants indicted for involvement in the bloody 1873 
Colfax Massacre.274 The indictments failed to allege that the defend-
ants’ violence was racially motivated—“[w]e may suspect that race was 
the cause of the hostility; but it is not so averred.”275 Therefore, the 
 
 268. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009) [hereinafter 
Northwest Austin]. 
 269. The federalism framework may not be the optimal strategy to consider federal elec-
tion administration questions. Recent scholarship has acknowledged the limits of this “anti-
discrimination framework” under the Reconstruction Amendments in conjunction with 
broad congressional authority in the Elections Clause. See generally Franita Tolson, Election 
Law “Federalism” and the Limits of the Antidiscrimination Framework, 59 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 2211 (2018) [hereinafter Tolson, Limits of the Antidiscrimination Framework]; see also 
Tolson, Spectrum of Congressional Authority, supra note 16, at 364–388 (delineating when 
Congress may, in some circumstances, regulate voter qualifications under the Elections 
Clause despite the limiting federalism framework of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend-
ments). 
 270. See supra note 162.  
 271. United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221–22 (1875). 
 272. Id. at 218. 
 273. Id. at 220. 
 274. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 559 (1875). 
 275. Id. at 556. 
2020] AN UNTAPPED “ARSENAL OF POWER”  
 
 
 
175
indictments against the defendants were deemed defective because 
they were “too vague and general.”276 In Cruikshank, the Court did not 
strike down any provision of the Enforcement Acts. Overall, judicial 
scrutiny of the Acts tinkered with some vague wording. Shortly after 
the two decisions, Congress amended the laws to provide clarity and 
essentially reinstated the unconstitutionally vague sections; in doing 
so, “Congress ignored the Court’s decisions and passed a virtual fourth 
enforcement act.”277 
In the late 1870s and 1880s, the Supreme Court strongly upheld 
the federal government’s supervisory power over federal elections in 
two cases.278 In Ex parte Siebold, Justice Bradley went out of his way 
to limit the Court’s opinion to federal elections.279 Even so, he presaged 
a later Supreme Court decision confirming federal authority over elec-
tions involving both federal and state candidates.280 As most candi-
dates—federal and state—were printed on a single ballot, the question 
arose: where did the Enforcement Acts’ reach over federal elections 
end and the states’ authority begin?281 Bradley answered: “If for its 
own convenience a State sees fit to elect State and county officers at 
the same time and in conjunction with the election of representatives, 
Congress will not be thereby deprived of the right to make regulations 
in reference to the latter.”282 In other words, a state could not—and 
still cannot—schedule its elections to coincide with federal elections to 
block congressional authority over the whole election.283  
The Supreme Court’s decision in Ex parte Coy helped to clear any 
remaining confusion by recognizing federal authority over any election 
for both state and federal races.284 In that case, a group of defendants 
were charged with violating provisions of the federal election laws in-
cluding both conspiracy to commit election fraud and actual election 
 
 276. Id. at 559. 
 277. GOLDMAN, supra note 53, at 17; see also PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RETHINKING THE 
JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF RECONSTRUCTION 87–129 (2011) (detailing robust federal rights 
enforcement post-Cruikshank). 
 278. See supra Section II-A. 
 279. Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 393 (1880) (“[I]t must be remembered that we are 
dealing only with the subject of elections of representatives to Congress.”). 
 280. Ex Parte Coy, 127 U.S. 731, 752 (1888).  
 281. See, e.g., id. at 751–52 (“The votes for members of Congress are generally put into 
the same box with those cast for the various state and municipal officers.”). 
 282. 100 U.S. at 393 (emphasis added). 
 283. Later, in Ex parte Yarbrough, Justice Miller explained that the Fifteenth Amend-
ment “clearly shows that the right of suffrage was considered to be of supreme importance 
to the national government, and was not intended to be left within the exclusive control of 
the States.” Ex Parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 664 (1884). These cases stand for the propo-
sition that even many local elections fell within Congress’s purview. 
 284. 127 U.S. at 752. 
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fraud on the part of the election inspectors.285 The “essence of [the]  
indictment” was that although election inspectors were bound by  
Indiana law to safely keep election returns with them, the defendant 
election inspectors delivered the “certificates, poll lists, and tally  
papers to other persons who had no authority.”286 The defendants as-
serted that the federal court had no jurisdiction over them because 
they only violated Indiana state law by intending to tamper with state 
election returns.287 The Court disagreed. The federal government’s 
power to “secure the fair and honest conduct of a[] [congressional] elec-
tion . . . whatever is necessary to an honest and fair certification of 
such election, cannot be questioned.”288 The Court analogized the  
defendants’ position to that of a man who fires into a crowd meaning 
to shoot one person but harming another. The shooter should not be 
excused simply because he missed his target.289 Consequently, when-
ever election tampering involves state and federal candidates, federal 
jurisdiction is permitted. 
Congressional authority over elections involving both state and fed-
eral candidates continues to the modern era, following the reasoning 
of Coy.290 If a state truly wished to completely insulate its state elec-
tions from Congress’s broad Elections Clause authority, it could run 
wholly separate elections. On Monday, the state could have elections 
for federal candidates on their own ballot. On Tuesday, state and local 
candidates would be chosen on their separate ballot. But, as legal 
scholar Pamela Karlan has explained, Congress’s power over mixed 
elections essentially gives it “leverage over the electoral process as a 
whole, since few jurisdictions can afford to run dual election sys-
tems.”291 The Elections Clause does not reach local elections when they 
 
 285. Id. at 743–48 (listing the charges against the defendants and concluding that the 
indictment, in sum, was the omission of the state inspectors’ duty as imposed by Indiana 
law). 
 286. Id. at 748. 
 287. Id. at 732 (alleging that indictment did not present charges against the United 
States “and that the federal district court and the grand jury thereof had no jurisdiction in 
the premises”). 
 288. Id. at 752. 
 289. Id. at 753–54. 
 290. See, e.g., United States v. McCranie, 169 F.3d 723, 727 (11th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he Con-
stitution’s Necessary and Proper Clause, . . . along with Art. I, § 4, empowers Congress to 
regulate mixed elections even if the federal candidate is unopposed.”); United States v.  
Mason, 673 F.2d 737, 739 (4th Cir. 1982) (explaining that congressional power to regulate 
federal elections “clearly includes the power to regulate conduct which, although directed at 
non-federal elections, also has an impact on the federal races”); United States v. Bowman, 
636 F.2d 1003, 1010 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981) (“[T]he fact that a state decides to hold its elec-
tions on the same day as federal elections does not deprive Congress of the right to legislate 
on matters affecting the federal races.”). 
 291. Pamela S. Karlan, Framing the Voting Rights Claims of Cognitively Impaired Indi-
viduals, 38 MCGEORGE L. REV. 917, 927 (2007). 
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do not coincide with federal elections.292 But federal authority remains 
paramount when local voting practices are discriminatory on the basis 
of race, gender, age, or payment of taxes.  
Put simply, congressional authority over federal, state, and local 
elections is expansive. It is broadest in regulating federal and federal-
state elections, but congressional authority is still potent in excising 
discriminatory conduct from state and local elections. The next section 
details what an enhanced federal role in election administration looks 
like based on the original Enforcement Acts. 
IV.   FEDERAL ELECTION ADMINISTRATION LEGISLATION 
A Modern Enforcement Act (“MEA”) would be on firm constitutional 
and historical ground.293 Moreover, the MEA could address several 
identified weak points in the United States’ election administration 
system. First, unlike the original Enforcement Acts, the MEA would, 
through an insulated and nonpartisan agency, provide uniform time, 
place, and manner election regulations. Currently, the United States 
has a diverse patchwork of election laws that morph from election cycle 
to election cycle, sometimes depending on which political party con-
trols the levers of power. A central Federal Election Administration 
Agency (“FEAA”) could reverse trends toward hyper-decentralization, 
cycle-to-cycle whiplash, and partisan election administration.294 Sec-
ond, like the original Enforcement Acts, the MEA could oversee elec-
tions at the request of voters. Such federal officers could repair some 
of the damage Shelby County has left in its wake. Meanwhile, this 
oversight infrastructure avoids the equal sovereignty issue that the 
Supreme Court found problematic in the Voting Rights Act’s Section 
4(b). 
  
 
 292. Ellen Katz, Congressional Power to Extend Preclearance: A Response to Professor 
Karlan, 44 HOUSTON L. REV. 33, 46 (2007) (explaining that the Elections Clause “does not 
reach purely local elections, the very elections where section 5 [of the VRA] appears to be 
most important”) (footnote omitted).  
 293. I refer to the hypothetical legislation simply as the Modern Enforcement Act 
(“MEA”) as shorthand, though this name should not obscure its source of authority as more 
than simply the Fifteenth Amendment. Instead, the MEA draws significant authority from 
the Elections Clause. Such a bill can take a variety of names, from the generic—the Democ-
racy Reform Act, or the Federal Elections and Administration Act—to the acronym-
friendly—the Federal Integrity in Voting and Elections Act (FIVE Act), the More Voting and 
Participation in Elections Act (More VAPE Act), or the Federal Election and Democratic 
Uniformity Promotion Act (FED UP Act).  
 294. Justin Weinstein-Tull, Election Law Federalism, 114 MICH. L. REV. 747, 752–53 
(2016) (outlining “hyperfederalized” nature of the American election administration system). 
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A.   Toward Neutrality and Uniformity:  
The Federal Election Administration Agency  
The original Enforcement Acts did not have a central federal elec-
tion administration unit. An unpassed 1890 bill proposed a three-
member United States Board of Canvassers, appointed by a federal 
court, to certify election results directly to Congress when an entire 
congressional district was petitioned for federal supervision.295 The 
proposed Board would have acted more or less as a district court for 
election disputes.296  
Meanwhile, the Enforcement Acts of 1870 and 1871 were paradox-
ically detailed but vague and underinclusive. They listed election-re-
lated crimes and federal oversight procedures explicitly but left en-
forcement mechanisms and federal court jurisdictional boundaries un-
clear.297 Federal officials were sometimes too reliant on overburdened 
federal courts for clarification and enforcement.298 Moreover, by focus-
ing primarily on blatant racial discrimination or obvious fraud like 
ballot stuffing, the laws failed to address less flagrant types of election-
related problems, like barriers to ballot access, ineffective administra-
tion, or identifying and removing biased election officials. 
An FEAA could constitutionally do much more. It could avoid the 
problems of under-inclusivity and vagueness that hindered the judi-
cially focused original Enforcement Acts. An FEAA would serve to em-
power a team of neutral election administration professionals to prom-
ulgate precise rules and regulations detailing the times, place, and 
manner of federal elections, as well as election adjudicators to resolve 
many election-related disputes.  
1. The Agency’s Structure: Embracing Neutrality, Avoiding  
Gridlock.  
The crown jewel of an FEAA should be maximum insulation from 
partisan influence. After all, “[a]n election is only fair if it is adminis-
tered in a neutral, unbiased way.”299 Looking back in time again, the 
 
 295. Henry Cabot Lodge & T.V. Powderly, The Federal Election Bill, 151 N. AM. REV. 
257, 258 (1890) (statement by T.V. Powderly). 
 296. Among other things, the Board could call for parties to produce relevant documents 
and certifications as well as summon and compel attendance of supervisors of elections. See 
id. (describing Board’s duties); see also 51 CONG. REC. 6538 (1st Sess. 1890); 51 CONG. REC. 
24 (1d Sess. 1890). The members of the federal board would serve for two years and no more 
than two of them could be a member of the same political party. 51 CONG. REC. 24 (1d Sess. 
1890). 
 297. See generally supra Section I-D(1)–(2). 
 298. Swinney, supra note 164, at 212 (“The Enforcement Acts imposed an unmanageable 
extra burden on an antiquated judicial structure.”); see also supra notes 200–06 (detailing 
burden Enforcement Acts placed on federal courts). 
 299. Gaughan, Illiberal Democracy, supra note 23, at 119. 
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original Enforcement Acts contained some elements of neutrality. 
Election supervisors were judicially appointed, though their vetting 
and appointments attracted grumbles from overburdened federal 
judges.300 Even so, the Acts were deeply unpopular with Democrats 
who viewed the laws as a partisan cudgel on the part of Republicans.301 
Their antipathy was not baseless. U.S. marshals and deputy marshals, 
who were tasked with significant election regulation duties, were in 
fact executive—partisan—appointments.302 Not to mention, Republi-
cans controlled the executive branch for all but six years between 1870 
and 1894.  
Partisan election administration exists to the current day.303 
Thirty-three states’ chief elections officers are partisan officials; with 
many appointed by a partisan governor in the eighteen other states.304 
In one comprehensive study, political scientists Martha Kropf and Da-
vid Kimball summarized how partisan election administration can 
manifest itself. They found that election officials may impart their 
views on the government’s role in elections in how effectively they im-
plement election laws; if elected, these officials may feel “beholden to 
their party for help in their own elections” and “may feel the need to 
act as representatives or agents of their [own] political party.”305 
Even more, some state’s chief elections officers have overseen elec-
tions while simultaneously seeking another statewide office like gov-
ernor or U.S. senator. In 2018, for example, Kansas Secretary of State 
Kris Kobach agreed to recuse himself from a very narrow recount in 
the Republican gubernatorial primary, in which he was a candidate, 
only after tremendous public pressure.306 In Georgia, the Republican 
Secretary of State resigned shortly before a hearing in federal court 
over a lawsuit seeking, among other things, his recusal from the vote 
tabulation of a very close and controversial election in which he was 
 
 300. See supra notes 200–06 (detailing burdens Enforcement Acts placed on federal 
judges). 
 301. See supra notes 124–25 and accompanying text (discussing partisan nature of some 
federal marshals in the election regulation space). 
 302. Id. 
 303. Gaughan, Illiberal Democracy, supra note 23, at 83 (“Unusual among leading de-
mocracies, the United States entrusts the administration of elections to partisan political 
operators.”); see also Hasen, Beyond the Margin, supra note 23, at 974 (describing chief elec-
tion officers’ selection and partisan status).  
 304. Gaughan, Illiberal Democracy, supra note 23, at 83 (citing MICHAEL R. DIMINO, SR., 
BRADLEY A. SMITH & MICHAEL E. SOLIMINE, UNDERSTANDING ELECTION LAW AND VOTING 
RIGHTS 215 (2017)). 
 305. MARTHA KROPF & DAVID C. KIMBALL, HELPING AMERICA VOTE: THE LIMITS OF 
ELECTION REFORM 97–98 (2012). 
 306. Mitch Smith, Kobach Says He Will Recuse Himself From Kansas Primary Vote 
Count, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/09/us/politics/kansas-
kobach-colyer-votes.html [https://perma.cc/BZA5-USZ2]. 
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the putative winner of the governor’s race.307 And, in Florida, Governor 
Rick Scott faced a federal lawsuit seeking his recusal during the re-
count in his race against the incumbent Democratic senator.308 “Grave 
problems arise when an individual involved in the electoral process 
uses his official powers to influence the outcome. Unconstitutionality 
can follow,” the federal judge wrote.309 Though the court declined to 
order Scott’s recusal, the judge warned Scott that he was “sometimes 
careening perilously close to a due process violation.”310  
Unsurprisingly, partisan election administration is not popular 
with the public. One recent report indicated that, based on surveys, 
“election officials will continue to retain high levels of public approval 
if they are viewed as nonpartisan experts.”311 Only twenty percent of 
survey respondents indicate support for choosing election officials in 
partisan contests.312 These results are similar to older studies. One 
study revealed that sixty-six percent of respondents favored nonparti-
san local or state officials running elections.313  
While partisan election administration is unpopular and poten-
tially problematic, nonpartisan administration can take on various 
beneficial forms.314 Relevant here, the original Enforcement Acts 
tasked busy federal judges with appointing election supervisors on a 
jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction basis.315 The MEA could thread the needle 
between partisan election oversight and constant intervention from 
the federal judiciary—through a neutral, independent agency com-
prised of election professionals.316  
 
 307. Alan Blinder, Brian Kemp Resigns as Georgia Secretary of State, With Governor’s 
Race Still Disputed, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/08/us/ 
georgia-brian-kemp-resign-stacey-abrams.html [https://perma.cc/4PJS-BVPQ]. 
 308. League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Scott, 366 F. Supp. 3d 1311 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 15, 
2018) 
 309. Id. at 1315. 
 310. Id. at 1317. 
 311. Natalie Adona & Paul Gronke, Understanding the Voter Experience: The Public’s 
View of Election Administration and Reform, DEMOCRACY FUND (Oct. 2018), https://www. 
democracyfund.org/media/uploaded/2018_CCESReport_vFinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/VD4E-
8BRT] (emphasis added). 
 312. Id. at 22. 
 313. Tokaji, The Future of Election Reform, supra note 11, at 132, (citing R. MICHAEL 
ALVAREZ & THAD E. HALL, PUBLIC ATTITUDES ABOUT ELECTION GOVERNANCE 6 (2005)). 
 314. See, e.g., Daniel P. Tokaji, America’s Top Model: The Wisconsin Government  
Accountability Board, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 575 (2013) (outlining benefits of now-dismantled 
nonpartisan election administration agency).  
 315. See supra notes 69–72 and accompanying text (explaining election supervisor ap-
pointment); see also supra notes 200–06 (detailing burdens Enforcement Acts placed on fed-
eral judges). 
 316. This sort of entity would be novel in the United States, to be sure. But not elsewhere 
among leading democracies. Canada, for example, has an independent Chief Electoral Of-
ficer. See Gaughan, Illiberal Democracy, supra note 23, at 120–22 ; see also Hasen, Beyond 
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The FEAA would need an effective structure. It should be com-
prised of an odd number of members—say, five individuals. Each mem-
ber would be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. 
Their terms would last longer than a presidential term—say, six or ten 
years. No single political party could have a majority of members. H.R. 
1 proposes reforming the Federal Election Commission along a similar 
membership structure.317 This “tri-partisan”—or, even better, nonpar-
tisan—structure offers two benefits. First, no single political party can 
form a majority of the Agency’s leadership. In effect, this leadership 
structure would likely result in two Democratic members, two Repub-
lican members, and an independent member, if the agency was com-
prised of five members. That independent member could act as a 
bridge between the two parties or, less optimistically, serve as this 
body’s swing vote. 
This structure is not new. In January 1877, Congress passed the 
Electoral Commission Act in response to the still-unresolved 1876 
presidential election.318 Disputes over election results in several South-
ern states had prevented a winner from emerging, and, with Inaugu-
ration Day looming, the United States careened toward a constitu-
tional crisis. The Act created a fifteen-member Commission to properly 
tally the electoral votes, with five members chosen each by the House, 
Senate, and Supreme Court.319 The majority party in each house of 
Congress received three seats, and the minority party was allowed 
two—a purposeful arrangement since Democrats controlled the House 
and Republicans had a Senate majority.320 The Supreme Court selected 
two Democrats, two Republicans, and one “avowed Independent,” Jus-
tice David Davis.321 The Commission seemed to result in a seven-seven-
one split. Davis, however, never served because the Illinois legislature 
elected him senator.322 His replacement was a Republican justice and, 
ultimately, Republican Rutherford B. Hayes became president.323 The 
brief presence of a truly independent fifteenth member gave the Com-
mission a semblance of impartiality and legitimacy. 
The Agency’s odd number of members would serve another ra-
tionale: avoiding gridlock. The Federal Election Commission (FEC), 
 
the Margin, supra note 23, at 985–86 (discussing Canadian and Australian election admin-
istration). 
 317. See H.R. 1, 116th Cong. (2019).   
 318. C. VANN WOODWARD, REUNION AND REACTION 161 (1956). 
 319. Id.  
 320. Id. at 162. 
 321. Id. 
 322. Id. at 165. 
 323. Id. at 161–66 (describing the formation and members of the 1877 Electoral Com-
mission).  
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which regulates another area of particular partisan interest—cam-
paign finance—is required by statute to have six members, three from 
each major political party.324 The deadlock on the FEC is well known.325 
With its poor employee morale, commissioners’ public antipathy to 
each other, 326 and even some commissioners suing (in their private ca-
pacity) to force the agency to act,327 the FEC serves as a model of what 
not to look for in a federal agency. It is little surprise that reforming 
the FEC is one feature of H.R. 1.328 Simply put, an odd-numbered 
agency is far less likely to result in gridlock. 
Who could serve in the role of a federal election administrator,  
supervisor, or observer is also important. Identifying and selecting 
qualified administrators would serve as a further insulator from par-
tisanship. Congress could limit potential administrators, supervisors, 
or observers from a wider pool of individuals on the basis of their pro-
fessional qualifications, relevant achievements, public reputation, and 
experience in election administration. Alternatively, Congress could 
designate another body of qualified experts, such as academics, judges, 
and civil servants, to identify and endorse potential federal election 
administrators, supervisors, and observers. 
2. The Federal Election Administration Agency’s Rulemaking 
The FEAA would possess rulemaking authority to promulgate uni-
form, nationwide election administration standards and regulations. 
Such rulemaking authority would flow directly from its organic stat-
ute, the hypothetical MEA and the law’s constitutional foundations, 
the Elections Clause, and the Fifteenth Amendment. An Elections 
Clause based agency would fit squarely within the set of agencies “with 
substantive rulemaking authority [that] should be viewed as having 
 
 324. 52 U.S.C. § 30106(a)(1) (“No more than 3 members of the Commission appointed 
under this paragraph may be affiliated with the same political party.”). 
 325. Ann M. Ravel, Dysfunction and Deadlock at the Federal Election Commission, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 20, 2017) (departing commissioner writing “that the agency remains dysfunc-
tional” because the three Republican members are “ideologically opposed to the F.E.C.’s pur-
pose” and “have been enabled by the commission’s very structure”). 
 326. See Dave Levinthal, Report: FEC Leaders, Managers Share Blame for Horrid  
Morale, CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY (July 26, 2016), https://www.publicinteg-
rity.org/2016/07/26/20006/report-fec-leaders-managers-share-blame-horrid-morale [https:// 
perma.cc/D3GG-JLUP]. 
 327. See Colby Itkowitz, Corporations are people. But are FEC commissioners people too?, 
WASH. POST (June 18, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/ 
2015/06/18/corporations-are-people-but-are-fec-commissioners-people-too/? [https://perma. 
cc/3NPB-PSLE]. 
 328. See, e.g., Paul Smith, H.R.1 Would Fix—and Protect—Democracy in the U.S., U.S. 
NEWS (Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/2019-01-
29/commentary-hr-1-would-fix-and-protect-democracy-in-the-us [https://perma.cc/HGS5-
SYH6] (“H.R. 1 fixes the FEC by ending the gridlock that has plagued it over the last dec-
ade.”). 
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the power to preempt state law without either their organic statutes 
explicitly providing for this preemption or Congress explicitly delegat-
ing preemptive discretion to the agencies.”329 Indeed, the FEAA exer-
cising Congress’s delegation of its “paramount” authority to “make or 
alter” state laws “at any time”330 would—more than any other agency 
executing any other law based on any other constitutional provision—
preempt state laws, regulations, and rules over most elections.331 As 
Justice Scalia wrote not long ago, “[b]ecause the power the Elections 
Clause confers is none other than the power to pre-empt, the reasona-
ble assumption is that the statutory text [flowing from that power] ac-
curately communicates the scope of Congress’s pre-emptive intent.”332 
That federal election regulations would originate from the FEAA 
rather than Congress, is a feature, rather than a bug, of the MEA. 
Congress has hardly been a model of electoral reform activity in recent 
memory. It last passed a major election law in 2006 when it reauthor-
ized the Voting Rights Act.333 Since then, countless new issues have 
come up necessitating congressional action—a revitalized Voting 
Rights Act, campaign finance reform in the wake of Citizens United, 
gaps in election-related cybersecurity, to name just a few. While Con-
gress has come close on rare occasions,334 no action has been taken. 
This inactivity, particularly in the field of election administration, 
makes sense considering that members of Congress have a vested in-
terest in the outcome of election-related legislation—reelection, for ex-
ample. Not so for Agency members. 
 
 329. Joshua Hawkes & Mark Seidenfeld, A Positive Defense of Administrative Preemp-
tion, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 63, 64 (2014). 
 330. Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 570 U.S. 1, 8–9 (2013). 
 331. The Elections Clause’s federal supremacy would give the MEA preemptive author-
ity. Any regulations promulgated under the MEA, therefore, would necessarily have preemp-
tive weight over the states. Tolson, Reinventing Sovereignty?, supra note 16, at 1200 (“The 
[Clause’s] text explicitly rejects the notion of shared power by depriving the states of final 
authority and allowing for the possibility of federal preemption.”); see also Michael T. Morley, 
Reverse Nullification and Executive Discretion, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1283, 1317 n. 265 
(2010) (explaining how Congress can preempt state law under the Elections Clause and dis-
place state law independent of the Supremacy Clause). 
 332. 570 U.S. at 14. 
 333. See Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act 
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–246, §§ 4–5, 120 Stat. 577, 
580–81 (2006) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973c). 
 334. See, e.g., Democracy Is Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending in Elections Act 
of 2012 (DISCLOSE), S. 3369, 112th Cong. (2012). 
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Administrative rulemaking also has certain benefits. Some scholars 
have argued that agency action is more transparent,335 deliberative,336 
and accountable337 than legislation. In the election administration con-
text, rulemaking would have even more pronounced benefits. Most ob-
viously, FEAA rules would come from a neutral, nonpartisan body—
not Congress and not from a state-level politician turned chief elec-
tions officer. Hypothetically, the public could view an otherwise con-
troversial rule with more confidence and legitimacy if originating from 
a neutral agency rather than if decreed by partisan state officer or 
passed through partisan legislation.338 
Implementing the FEAA rules would create a significantly greater 
degree of nationwide uniformity in election administration than cur-
rently exists. “The first glaring institutional feature evident to even 
the most casual observer of the U.S. electoral system is the extreme 
decentralization of administrative responsibilities and policymak-
ing.”339 Uniformity in election rules offers: predictability, decreased op-
portunities for political gamesmanship, and decreased odds that some 
voters are left out. As legal scholar Richard Hasen explains,  
[T]he more that can be done to assure that the laws, rules of in-
terpretation, machinery, and practices are uniform, the more there 
will be a common understanding of the rules of the game. Such a 
common understanding can work to forge consensus against law-
lessness and toward quick resolution of election disputes.340  
 
 335. See Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism: Preemption, 
Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933, 1954–61 (2008); 
Peter H. Schuck, Delegation and Democracy: Comments on David Schoenbrod, 20 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 775, 781 (1999) (“The agency is often a more meaningful site for public participation 
than Congress, because the policy stakes for individuals and interest groups are most imme-
diate, transparent, and well-defined at the agency level.”); id. at 781–82 (detailing transpar-
ency of agency vis-à-vis the public). 
 336. See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 337, at 1971–79; see also Thomas Merrill, 
Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 727, 755 (2008) (“[G]iven their abil-
ity to undertake wide-ranging investigations of industry structure and other types of  
relevant legislative facts, agencies have factfinding abilities that surpass those of either  
Congress or the courts.”).  
 337. See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 337, at 1981–83; see also Frank B. Cross, Shat-
tering the Fragile Case for Judicial Review of Rulemaking, 85 VA. L. REV. 1243, 1274 (1999) 
(“[T]he democratic features of the bureaucracy are often overlooked. The bureaucratic  
process is permeable to citizens as well as interest groups.”); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic  
Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1554–62 (1992) 
(noting some agency “procedures . . . facilitate access and public interest oriented discourse”). 
 338. See, e.g., Hasen, From Bad to Worse, supra note 20, at 653 (“Already, public confi-
dence in the fairness of the election process is largely driven by who wins and who loses 
elections.”); see also Tokaji, supra note 316, at 576–77. 
 339. Nathaniel Persily, “Celebrating” the Tenth Anniversary of the 2000 Election Contro-
versy: What the World Can Learn from the Recent History of Election Dysfunction in the 
United States, 44 IND. L. REV. 85, 85 (2010). 
 340. Richard L. Hasen, Bush v. Gore and the Lawlessness Principle: A Comment on Pro-
fessor Amar, 61 FLA. L. REV. 979, 988 (2009) [hereinafter Hasen, Lawlessness Principle].  
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Predictability would be a main feature of uniform election admin-
istration. As of now, the decentralized nature of election administra-
tion “leads to a variety of decisions in machinery purchases, vote-
counting rules, ballot security procedures, training of poll workers, and 
in other areas.”341 Take, for example, early voting. In 2016, there was 
an eclectic variation across states and localities in terms of in-person 
early voting and absentee voting.342 Voters in Wisconsin Rapids,  
Wisconsin could vote as early as September 19, 2016— a full fifty days 
before Election Day—while voters in Connecticut, Delaware, New 
York, and Pennsylvania, among others, could only vote early with an 
absentee ballot and only if they met a state-approved excuse.343  
Uniform federal election regulations would also diminish the need 
for troubling lame-duck “power grabs” that have occurred in recent 
years. After Republicans lost gubernatorial races in North Carolina in 
2016 and Wisconsin and Michigan in 2018, Republican legislatures 
passed lame-duck laws, ostensibly aiming to limit the incoming Dem-
ocratic governors’ powers.344 Many of these limiting moves focused on 
election laws. In North Carolina, for example, county election boards 
were transformed from being run by the governor’s party to evenly 
split compositions with Republicans chairing the boards in election 
years.345 In Wisconsin, a lame-duck law drastically cut early voting.346  
Election law whiplash from administration to administration would 
decrease in a world of uniform election rules. One federal judge in Flor-
ida observed:  
[N]ationwide trends in which the spigot to access the United 
States’ most “precious” and “fundamental” right, the right to vote, 
depends on who controls the levers of power . . . . That spigot is 
turned on or off depending on whether politicians perceive they will 
benefit from the expansion or contraction of the electorate.347  
 
 341. Hasen, Beyond the Margin, supra note 23, at 952. 
 342. Brent Griffiths, When Does Early Voting Start in Every State? POLITICO (Sept. 21, 
2016), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/09/early-voting-states-228435 [https://perma.cc/ 
P7L2-NHBV]. 
 343. Id. 
 344. Michael Wines, A Power Grab? Politics as Usual? Michigan’s Governor Will Decide, 
N.Y. TIMES, (Dec. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/17/us/rick-snyder-bill-
whitmer.html [https://perma.cc/US42-TFB6].  
 345. See Cooper v. Berger, 809 S.E.2d 98, 101–02 (N.C. 2018) (detailing law). 
 346. Among other things, the lame-duck law limited time for in-person absentee voting, 
restricted the use of student identification cards for voting, and placed a time limit on the 
validity of temporary identification cards issued under a petition process. One Wisconsin 
Inst., Inc. v. Thomsen, 15-cv-324-jdp, 2019 WL 254093, at *1 351 F. Supp. 3d 1160, 1160 
(W.D. Wis. Jan. 17, 2019). A federal judge enjoined these provisions, stating “[t]his is not a 
close question.” Id. 
 347. Hand v. Scott, 285 F. Supp. 1289, 1310 (N.D. Fla. 2018). 
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The judge addressed the sharp changes in Florida’s felony re-enfran-
chisement methods, though felons’ voting rights is a voter qualification 
issue.348 Examples arise in procedural rules abound. After North Car-
olinians elected a Republican governor in 2012, the legislature slashed 
early voting from seventeen to ten days and eliminated same-day reg-
istration.349 With the FEAA as the rulemaking body, partisan actors 
seeking to massage the rules for their perceived benefit would have to 
work only through a neutral, nonpartisan agency. 
Uniform election administration would also lessen the risk that 
states treat some voters unequally, either through discriminatory con-
duct or incompetence. Consider also the location of polling places. The 
FEAA could promulgate neutral guidelines to ease insufficient num-
bers of voting locations in some places, particularly during early vot-
ing. For example, it could require an early voting site for every 10,000 
registered voters in a county or parish. Such requirements would aim 
to prevent the long lines that plagued some counties during 2016’s 
early voting period, such as in Gwinnett County, Georgia350 and many 
counties in North Carolina.351 Alternatively, or in addition, Congress 
could set state-neutral guidelines requiring polling locations within a 
certain square mileage. These requirements would ease the travel bur-
dens that many voters face in getting to polling locations. For example, 
nine Native American tribes in Nevada were denied their own early 
voting locations in 2016, which led many of them to take a “roughly 
200 mile round-trip drive” to vote.352 These problems are also endemic 
in South Dakota, where Native American voters typically travel long 
distances to get to the polls.353 
Finally, uniform election administration would conform to the 
equal state sovereignty principle. In Northwest Austin, the Court  
identified “our historic tradition that all the States enjoy ‘equal 
 
 348. Id. During the last gubernatorial administration’s four years in office, approxi-
mately 154,000 former felons had their voting rights restored; the following eight years un-
der Governor Rick Scott saw approximately 3,000 former felons regain those rights. Id. 
 349. North Carolina State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 216–17 (4th 
Cir. 2016). 
 350. Tyler Estep, Early Voting Off to a Roaring Start in Gwinett, ATLANTA JOURNAL-
CONSTITUTION (Oct. 17, 2016), http://www.ajc.com/news/local/early-voting-off-roaring-start-
gwinnett/hIFM4Dl9D7dsHWyMmdVk1I/ [https://perma.cc/MRB2-LZRL]. 
 351. Jim Morrill, Early Voting Opens to Long Lines Across NC, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER 
(Oct. 20, 2016), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/politics-government/article1093 
69072.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2020). 
 352. Kira Lerner, Nevada Elections Chief Refuses to Accommodate Native Americans 
Who Have to Drive 200 Miles to Vote, THINKPROGRESS (Oct. 27, 2016), https://think 
progress.org/native-tribes-denial-7e0315de3810#.cqsfljxd0 [https://perma.cc/5YGN-CWAB]. 
 353. See, e.g., Kira Lerner, How A South Dakota County Is Suppressing The Native Amer-
ican Vote, THINKPROGRESS (Oct. 24, 2014), https://thinkprogress.org/how-a-south-dakota-
county-is-suppressing-the-native-american-vote-233655d3b345#.duvb98cyw [https://perma. 
cc/7H4X-UE36] (highlighting a 50-mile round trip to the polls).  
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sovereignty.’”354 The Voting Rights Act’s coverage formula “raise[d] se-
rious constitutional questions” because it seemed to encroach on “the 
fundamental principle of equal sovereignty” that “requires a showing 
that a statute’s disparate geographic coverage is sufficiently related to 
the problem that it targets.”355 Chief Justice Roberts noted that the Act 
“imposes current burdens and must be justified by current needs.”356 
While the equal state sovereignty principle’s contours remain impre-
cise, nationwide uniformity in election laws would result in minimal 
disparate geographic coverage. Any variation would be “sufficiently re-
lated to the problem that it targets.”357  
The “sufficient relation” standard seems to complement one argua-
ble benefit of the current decentralized system of election administra-
tion—that state and local bodies can experiment, innovate, or tailor 
election practices to the unique needs and circumstances of a particu-
lar place.358 Part of that tailoring and experimentation could involve 
local citizen engagement and input. Under the MEA, if the FEAA is a 
distant body in Washington, D.C. passing down rules on federal elec-
tions’ times, place, and manner, does that stifle any sort of citizen en-
gagement on the question of times, places, and manner? It need not. 
For one, the MEA could permit the FEAA to engage in informal rule-
making, which requires notice and comment procedures under the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act.359 Ideally, the “interested persons” engag-
ing in commenting on proposed rules would include significant citizen 
input on best election practices, such as the importance of early voting 
or a sensible ballot design.360  
Even more, uniform regulations do not have to be one size fits all. 
That is, FEAA regulations could bake in state and local flexibility. The 
Agency can promulgate minimum standards—rather than exact for-
mulas or rules—that leave implementation power to state or local en-
tities to conduct federal elections within certain broad parameters, pa-
rameters that do not currently exist. These federal guideposts could 
relate to voting machinery, times to conduct early voting, or polling 
place locations under some sort of population and geographic calcula-
tion, among other issues. For example, an FEAA regulation requiring 
 
 354. Northwest Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One. v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009), 129 
S. Ct. at 2512 (quoting United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 16 (1960). 
 355. Id. at 203–04. 
 356. Id. at 203. 
 357. Id. at 203. 
 358. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (observing how states can 
be laboratories of democracy). 
 359. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c)(2012); see also supra notes 337–39 and accompanying text 
(highlighting scholarship on accessibility and transparency of administrative rulemaking).  
 360. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012). 
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fifteen days of early voting at sites convenient to public transportation 
(as H.R. 1 proposes)361 would not prohibit a state or locality from re-
quiring twenty days of early voting at sites both near and far from 
public transportation. In short, the FEAA can identify broad floors and 
ceilings that are uniform across the country but also include a signifi-
cant amount of flexibility for jurisdiction-specific needs. 
3. Adjudication  
Courts regularly hear and resolve complex disputes over local and 
state voting laws. Since 2000, election litigation has exploded with no 
signs of slowing down.362 “[T]he pace of litigation has remained at more 
than double the pre-2000 rate, and litigation in the 2016 election pe-
riod is up twenty-three percent compared to the 2012 election period,” 
summarizes Richard Hasen.363 Some scholars argue that “increased 
federal court involvement in election administration is a good thing, 
given that federal judges are insulated from partisan politics.”364 
However, reliance on the courts for resolving election disputes is 
not a silver bullet. One overarching concern with the nineteenth-cen-
tury Enforcement Acts was the immense burden they placed on the 
federal judiciary.365 With election litigation steadily increasing, often 
at the eleventh hour, some federal courts risk similar straining of  
limited resources.366  
Further, judicial decisions are not insulated from partisanship.367 
An increased judicial role in election litigation can undermine public 
confidence in the judiciary. Many scholars have traced judges’ political 
 
 361. H.R. 1, 116th Cong. (2019). 
 362. Tokaji & Wolfe, supra note 17, at 970 (“While election administration is still mostly 
a matter of state law and local practice, the federal government—especially its courts—plays 
a more significant role today than was the case in the last century.”); see also Richard L. 
Hasen, The Democracy Canon, 62 STAN. L. REV. 69, 89–91 (2009) (describing the increase in 
election law litigation since 2000). 
 363. Hasen, From Bad to Worse, supra note 20, at 629. 
 364. Tokaji & Wolfe, supra note 17, at 971. See also Tokaji, The Future of Election Re-
form, supra note 11, at 149–53; Id. at 149 (“Federal judges are, however, more insulated from 
partisan politics than any other institution of the federal government.”).  
 365. See supra notes 200–06 (detailing burdens Enforcement Acts placed on federal 
judges). 
 366. For one extreme example that occurred in Florida shortly after the 2018 elections 
when a single federal judge heard more than eight election disputes, see Dan Merica, “Star 
Trek” and Godzilla: Meet the colorful judge at the center of Florida’s recount lawsuits,  
CNN (Nov. 16, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/16/politics/florida-recount-judge-mark-
walker-lawsuits/index.html [https://perma.cc/K2TS-KF8K]. 
 367. This Article does not even broach the subject of judicial nominations and confirma-
tions, a white-hot issue in recent years. 
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preferences and their effects on election disputes in the courts.368 When 
judges are perceived to be partisan actors, public approval of them 
shifts along predictable partisan lines.369 This undermines confidence 
in the judiciary as a whole—particularly in election disputes.370 With 
judicial appointments as a key component of the Republican Party’s 
support371 and an increasing proportion of the federal judiciary blessed 
by the controversial conservative Federalist Society,372 moderates may 
want to seek alternatives to the courts for election litigation. 
The MEA could create one alternative. A system of administrative 
election courts could go further than the federal judiciary to insulate 
election disputes’ resolutions from partisanship. These tribunals 
would adjudicate garden-variety election disputes arising under the 
MEA and any FEAA regulations. Election court judges could come 
 
 368. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Polarization and the Judiciary, 22 ANN. REV. OF POL. 
SCI. 261, 269 (2019) [hereinafter Hasen, Polarization & Judiciary] (“Judges may behave 
most like partisans in cases involving the rules for elections, where the party’s future power 
may be at stake. Thus, scholars have found that in cases involving election issues . . . judges 
often vote for the result that would help their political party.”); Michael S. Kang & Joanna 
M. Shepherd, The Long Shadow of Bush v. Gore: Judicial Partisanship in Election Cases, 68 
STAN. L. REV. 1411, 1417–18 (2016) (finding state judges—particularly Republicans—decide 
candidate-litigated election disputes in favor of their political party); Justin Levitt, The Par-
tisanship Spectrum, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1787, 1831–32 (2014) (“There is plentiful room 
with-in these bounds for judges elected in partisan contests to systematically and routinely 
favor or punish Republican or Democratic litigants, depending on their personal partisan 
proclivities and their jurisdiction’s political composition.”); Mark Jonathan McKenzie, The 
Influence of Partisanship, Ideology, and the Law on Redistricting Decisions in the Federal 
Courts, 65 POL. RES. Q., 799, 808 (2012) (finding “striking evidence” of partisan judicial de-
cision making in redistricting cases that become more pronounced when law is ambiguous); 
Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 18–
29 (2008) (finding a federal judge’s vote in a Voting Rights Act dispute strongly predictive by 
ideology). 
 369. Hasen, Polarization & Judiciary, supra note 370, at 270–71. 
 370. See, e.g., Ben Klein, A Vote for Clarity: Establishing A Federal Test for Intervention 
in Election-Related Disputes, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1361, 1389 (2017) (arguing that clear 
standards for judicial intervention in election disputes can help protect public confidence in 
the judiciary); Joshua A. Douglas, The Procedure of Election Law in Federal Courts, 2011 
UTAH L. REV. 433, 440 (2011) (noting the “inherent tension” between a court’s legitimacy and 
a court’s necessity to “decide[]a hotly contested election law case [that] will open itself up to 
criticism of partisanship and overreaching simply based on the subject matter involved”); 
Christopher S. Elmendorf, Refining the Democracy Canon, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1051, 1060 
(2010) (observing that “[c]ourts that lack the public’s confidence [in election cases] may not 
be able to resolve election disputes authoritatively”); Hasen, Beyond the Margin, supra note 
23, at 993 (“Putting judges in the position of deciding election law questions when the winner 
and loser of its decision will be obvious can undermine the legitimacy of the courts.”).  
 371. Philip Bump, A Quarter of Republicans Voted for Trump to Get Supreme Court 
Picks—and It Paid Off, WASH. POST (June 26, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/politics/wp/2018/06/26/a-quarter-of-republicans-voted-for-trump-to-get-supreme-
court-picks-and-it-paid-off/?utm_term=.61e390a89ff4 [https://perma.cc/MDC2-NEUV]. 
 372. Hasen, Polarization & Judiciary, supra note 370, at 264; see also Peter Baker, A 
Conservative Court Push Decades in the Making, With Effects for Decades to Come, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/09/us/politics/supreme-court-con-
servatives-trump.html [https://perma.cc/YB97-NFQD]. 
 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:143 
 
190 
from a finite pool of pre-approved election professionals. Review of 
these courts’ decisions could go to a federal appellate court. Accord-
ingly, federal district courts may see a lightened load of election-sea-
son disputes over arguably minor technicalities, while litigants would 
still enjoy the benefits of an impartial tribunal.  
On the other hand, an administrative court system may not be par-
ties’ first choice to weigh in on substantial constitutional matters like 
the fundamental right to vote. Instead, a magistrate-like election 
judge could add another layer to federal election adjudication, one fo-
cused on fact-finding. Such a process would be similar to existing fed-
eral magistrate judges and their reports and recommendations to dis-
trict court judges.373 Federal law grants district judges broad discretion 
to provide magistrate judges the authority to conduct evidentiary 
hearings, propose findings of fact, and recommend outcomes.374  
Congress could limit the original jurisdiction of MEA disputes to a  
specialized magistrate and statutorily require some degree of defer-
ence to the election magistrate judge’s recommendation, such as a 
clear error standard of review.  
B.   Federal Election Oversight 
Federal election oversight can take on various forms.375 This Article 
envisions an actual—or threatened—federal presence in particular 
spaces, such as registration, polling, and vote-tabulation places. Such 
oversight would not be new. Modern federal election oversight or ob-
servation has existed in some form since the Voting Rights Act created 
federal election observer and examiner positions.376 And, as detailed 
above, federal election supervision existed in various forms until 1894. 
1. The Need for Federal Election Oversight 
Current federal election oversight is at its lowest ebb since before 
the enactment of the Voting Rights Act. In the wake of Shelby County’s 
invalidation of Section 4(b)’s preclearance formula, the Department of 
Justice interpreted the decision to reach any use of the formula.377 Con-
sequently, the decision has made the federal observer program “largely 
defunct,” according to one analysis.378 A jurisdiction must either 
 
 373. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (1968). 
 374. Id. 
 375. Weinstein-Tull, supra note 295, at 794–95 (discussing alternatives to federal elec-
tion oversight within existing agencies such as the Election Assistance Committee). 
 376. 42 U.S.C. § 1973f. (2006). 
 377. Harry Baumgarten, Failure to Observe: The Federal Observer Program After Shelby 
County, CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER (July 21, 2016), https://campaignlegal.org/update/failure-
observe-federal-observer-program-after-shelby-county [https://perma.cc/Y7C4-X7HB]. 
 378. Id. 
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consent to federal observers watching its election administration, or a 
court would have to order federal election observers in a jurisdiction.379 
Before the 2016 election, Attorney General Loretta Lynch said “our 
ability to deploy [federal observers] has been severely curtailed” as a 
result of Shelby County.380 As of March 2017, federal observers were 
eligible in only six political subdivisions in four states.381 
Before they were rendered toothless, federal election observers 
played important roles in deterring and preventing election-related 
chicanery.382 They were required to observe “whether persons who are 
entitled to vote are being permitted to vote” and “whether votes cast 
by persons entitled to vote are being properly tabulated.”383 Their pres-
ence alone deterred malfeasance and misfeasance, as according to one 
witness, “[f]ew officials discriminate when they are under the micro-
scope.”384 Observers also gathered information (sometimes prompting 
immediate, preventative action from the DOJ), documented poll-
worker practices and training, and generally “serve[d] as the eyes and 
ears of the Justice Department and federal courts.”385  
Another type of federal official, an examiner, played a more active 
role in voter registration in the 1960s and 1970s.386They were able to 
“examine voter registration applicants concerning their qualifications 
for voting, to create lists of eligible voters to forward to the local regis-
trar, and to issue voter registration certificates to eligible voters.”387 By 
the 1980s, however, the need for examiners to help register minority 
voters had decreased and Congress ultimately ended that program.388 
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Shelby County. Baumgarten, supra note 377 (identifying jurisdictions with federal observers 
in 2012 and 2014). 
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 385. Id. at 233. 
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 388. Id. at 238–39. 
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Congress can revitalize portions of these modern federal pro-
grams—in addition to the type of federal supervision of the 1870–71 
Enforcement Acts—as part of a “complete code” of election regulations 
that cover, among other things, “registration, supervision of voting  
. . . [and] the numerous requirements as to procedure and safeguards 
which experience shows are necessary in order to enforce the funda-
mental right involved.”389 Tapping into the Elections Clause’s deep  
reserve of federal authority, the MEA could reverse the “severely  
curtail[ed]” status of the federal observer program.390 A revitalized  
observer program could take a number of forms on the spectrum of 
historical election oversight—from the eyes and ears of the observer 
program to the more hands-on federal examiners and federal supervi-
sors programs. 
Recent elections have provided no shortage of justification for  
federal oversight and observation. North Dakota’s voter identification 
law made it tougher for Native Americans living on reservations to 
vote.391 Dodge City, Kansas’s 27,000 residents only had one voting  
location—and it was out of town.392 States are consistently and  
increasingly embarking on sprawling purges of the voting rolls.393  
Dubious methods of signature matching have led to thousands of  
lost ballots (and plenty of successful lawsuits).394 In each of these 
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recent examples, federal observation and oversight might have  
deterred local policymakers from implementing these procedures. 
Georgia’s experience in the 2018 gubernatorial race alone illus-
trates the aid federal oversight can provide.395 Now-Governor Brian 
Kemp was the Secretary of State and the state’s chief election officer.396 
From this perch of election administration, Kemp dished out a buffet 
of questionable practices. Shortly before Election Day, in a race polls 
showed was tight, Secretary Kemp accused Georgia Democrats of  
attempting to hack the state’s voter registration system, though citing 
no evidence.397 His office held up more than 53,000 voter registrations 
because those names failed to “exact match” with social security and 
driver’s license databases.398 A federal judge preliminarily enjoined the 
system for more than 3,000 individuals who were flagged for citizen-
ship status, gave them an opportunity to cure, and concluded the 
state’s system “sweep[s] broader than necessary to advance the State’s 
interest, creating confusion as Election Day looms.”399 Another federal 
judge preliminarily enjoined Georgia’s rejection of absentee ballots due 
to mismatched signatures and required those rejected voters to receive 
an opportunity to cure.400 And when parties sued Kemp over grave vul-
nerabilities in Georgia’s direct recording electronic voting systems, yet 
another federal judge observed Kemp and other state officials “had 
buried their heads in the sand” in addressing cybersecurity.401 Despite 
concluding that the plaintiffs had a substantial likelihood of success 
on many issues, the judge declined to enjoin Georgia’s direct recording 
electronic system because of the proximity to the 2018 elections.402 
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AP NEWS (Oct. 9, 2018), https://apnews.com/fb011f39af3b40518b572c8cce6e906c [https:// 
perma.cc/65KJ-EDT6]. 
 399. Georgia Coalition for People’s Agenda, Inc. v. Kemp, 347 F. Supp. 3d 1251, 1267 
(N.D. Ga. 2018). 
 400. Martin v. Kemp, 341 F. Supp. 3d 1326, 1341–42 (N.D. Ga. 2018). 
 401. Curling v. Kemp, 334 F. Supp. 3d 1303, 1327–28 (N.D. Ga. 2018). 
 402. Id. at 1326–27. 
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Curling v. Kemp and other recent decisions403 highlight an im-
portant issue in election litigation—eleventh-hour lawsuits and judi-
cial hesitation to remedy issues so close to elections.404 Federal election 
oversight could deter or prevent practices from being implemented 
without the time-consuming and costly resort to litigation. Take, for 
example, the recent issue of bilingual ballots for Puerto Rican voters.405 
The Voting Rights Act requires bilingual ballots for any citizen edu-
cated in Puerto Rico.406 Rather than force the Spanish-speaking voters 
to file a preliminary injunction motion in court (who still did not re-
ceive their full requested relief because of the election’s proximity),407 
federal election supervisors, at the behest of concerned citizens, could 
have quickly identified the faulty practice and worked to remedy it. 
Federal oversight could also, among other things, deter questionable 
signature mismatch policies, stem the tide of overinclusive voter 
purges, prompt action on cybersecurity, and, as truly neutral actors, 
restore universal public confidence in election administration.408  
2. The Mechanics of Federal Election Oversight 
Importantly, federal election regulators or observers need not re-
sult from a top-down, court- or DOJ-imposed mechanism. Citizen ini-
tiation can be a key feature of federal election oversight. The original 
Enforcement Acts only required two citizens to petition a federal court 
for election supervision per precinct—an extraordinarily low threshold 
for seeking federal oversight.409 A two-person threshold might not in-
dicate any semblance of a consensus in any community. Congress can 
set a higher threshold to trigger federal election oversight. Federal 
 
 403. See, e.g., Spirit Lake Tribe v. Jaeger, 2018 WL 5722665, at *1 (D.N.D. Nov. 1, 2018) 
(declining to enter a Temporary Restraining Order because, despite “great cause for con-
cern[,] . . . a further injunction on the eve of the election will create as much confusion as it 
will alleviate”); Madera v. Detzner, 325 F. Supp. 3d 1269, 1284 (N.D. Fla. 2018) (“Due to the 
timeline of this lawsuit and the looming deadlines Florida election officials face, this Court 
does not order all of Plaintiffs' requested relief. Rather, it orders attainable compliance with 
Section 4(e).”); Rangel-Lopez v. Cox, 344 F. Supp. 3d 1285, 1292 (D. Kan. 2018) (rejecting 
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order to open a second polling location “on the eve of 
election—just five days away”). 
 404. See Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4–5 (2006) (“Court orders affecting elections  
. . . can themselves result in voter confusion and consequent incentive to remain away from 
the polls.”).  
 405. Madera, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 1274–75. 
 406. 52 U.S.C. § 10303(e). 
 407. Madera, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 1284 (ordering Florida to provide Spanish-language 
sample ballots because election was too close for officials to provide official Spanish-language 
ballots). 
 408. Cf. Hasen, From Bad to Worse, supra note 20, at 653 (“Already, public confidence in 
the fairness of the election process is largely driven by who wins and who loses elections.”). 
 409. Enforcement Act of 1871, § 2, ch. 99, 16 Stat. 433 (1871). 
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oversight could require a number of signatories totaling one percent of 
all voters who cast ballots in the previous federal election.410  
This citizen-powered structure attempts to thread the needle be-
tween no oversight and the Voting Rights Act’s preclearance infra-
structure that the Supreme Court characterized as one in which 
“[s]tates must beseech the Federal Government for permission to im-
plement laws.”411 Any beseeching under this regime would come from 
a chorus of citizens. The MEA would place a group of citizens as deci-
sionmakers on the federal oversight question. And, because every ju-
risdiction would have an equal opportunity to petition for federal over-
sight, this structure avoids an equal state sovereignty issue.  
A citizen-initiated federal oversight mechanism can also supple-
ment the Voting Rights Act’s bail-in provisions. Section 3(c) of the Act 
authorizes courts to place jurisdictions under preclearance if the court 
finds Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment violations, necessitating 
equitable relief have occurred.412 That preclearance requires that vot-
ing procedures must be shown to “not have the purpose and will not 
have the effect” of denying voting rights for a discriminatory purpose 
before implementation.413 Section 3(c) jurisprudence is notably lim-
ited.414 One district court in Arkansas, in placing a district under pre-
clearance, considered the persistence of violations, temporal proximity 
to the litigation, likelihood of their recurrence, and outside political 
developments.415 In an MEA world, a court considering a Section 3(c) 
challenge could deem as persuasive whether a jurisdiction is regularly 
subject to federal oversight and federal officials regularly identify vot-
ing problems.  
 
 410. Alternatively, Professor Tolson suggests a 10,000-person threshold. See Franita Tol-
son, Setting a Voting Rights Agenda in an Era of “Legal” Disenfranchisement, in AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION SOCIETY, WHAT’S THE BIG IDEA: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING LAW AND 
POLICY IN THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION 1.3 (Oct. 2016). One implication of a relatively small 
numerical threshold to activate federal election oversight is that petitioners may not mirror 
the electoral district’s desires. For example, a concentrated number of activists in urban ar-
eas can petition for statewide oversight. A predominantly minority town in an otherwise 
white congressional district may provide enough petitions to place that district under federal 
oversight. The one-percent threshold is aimed to be an attainable total—but only if there is 
some demand for federal oversight. It requires some modicum of organization and prevents 
any frivolous or truly unwanted petitions for federal oversight. The FEAA could promulgate 
rules to streamline or tighten the petitioning process. For example, it could require at least 
one signature from every county in the state and/or one percent of all voters in every con-
gressional district for statewide petitions. 
 411. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 570 U.S. 529, 544 (2013). 
 412. 52 U.S.C. § 10302(c). 
 413. Id. 
 414. Travis Crum, The Voting Rights Act’s Secret Weapon: Pocket Trigger Litigation and 
Dynamic Preclearance, 119 YALE L. J. 1992, 2007 n. 87 (2010) (noting only one reported dis-
trict court “address[es] the standards for imposing preclearance”). 
 415. Jeffers v. Clinton, 740 F. Supp. 585, 601 (E.D. Ark. 1990). 
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To be clear, federal oversight alone is not a total substitute for pre-
clearance for the simple reason that preclearance is prophylactic—
identifying and rejecting problematic changes to election laws—while 
oversight is reactionary—stemming the bleeding from problems that 
may have slipped through the cracks. Even so, oversight can provide 
critical deterrent effects to any discrimination and incompetence that 
may slide beneath the radar of public awareness. And it can remedy 
such problems quicker than court enforcement. 
Robust federal election oversight could tilt the federal-state balance 
in election administration toward the federal government. Such a tilt 
would have far-reaching repercussions. Even in a universe where the 
MEA’s grant of authority to federal officials is taken to its maximum, 
state election officials will still be present during elections. At the very 
least, state officials would regulate purely state and purely local elec-
tions. As a practical matter, in many jurisdictions, state officials would 
be the only election workers present simply because there would not 
be enough federal officials. How, then, would federal election officials 
interact with state and local officials on the ground? In the nineteenth 
century, federal election officials supervised polling places and regis-
tration sites. They supplemented preexisting state election officers, 
but their supplementary role had final authority. 
In short, the MEA could authorize federal officials to occupy three 
roles that historical federal officials have occupied.416 First, federal of-
ficials could serve a supervisory function over state officials. Second, 
they could serve a supplementary role in actually administering elec-
tions, stepping in when necessary. Third, federal officials could serve 
as passive observers, the “eyes and ears” of the FEAA, the DOJ, and 
the federal judiciary.  
There remains a fourth possibility of federal election oversight—
commandeering state officials.417 But the commandeering question 
may be subsumed by the hypothetical FEAA’s broad grant of author-
ity. In jurisdictions where citizens have not petitioned for federal over-
sight, state and local officials would still be bound by FEAA regula-
tions over federal and mixed elections. In effect, state and local officials 
would become de facto agents of the federal government in adminis-
tering federal elections.418  
 
 416. See supra Section I. 
 417. Tolson, Limits of the Antidiscrimination Framework, supra note 270, at 2218 (“[T]he 
[Elections Clause’s] text empowers Congress to engage in the quintessentially ‘anti-’federal-
ism action of displacing state law and commandeering state officials toward achieving this 
end.”). 
 418. See Arizona et al. v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc., 570 U.S. 1, 41 (2013) (Alito 
J., dissenting) (recognizing that federal regulations under the Elections Clause are “likely to 
displace not only state control of federal elections but also state control of state and local 
elections”). 
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In Ex Parte Siebold, the Supreme Court faced this exact question of 
which law—state or federal—a state election worker owed his alle-
giance to.419 In concluding that a state election worker is not shielded 
from federal authority by virtue of his position as a state worker, Jus-
tice Bradley wrote that the federal government “is not bound to stand 
by as a passive spectator, when duties are violated and outrageous 
frauds are committed” by a state official.420 “A violation of duty is an 
offence against the United States, for which the offender is justly ame-
nable to that government,” he explained.421 He based his conclusion on 
prudential concerns. Federal election regulation would otherwise be 
unsuccessful if state election workers were “amenable only to the su-
pervision of the State government which appointed them.”422 More re-
cently, in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,423 the Court described 
the Elections Clause as an effort “to minimize the possibility of state 
interference with federal elections.”424 In striking down an Arkansas 
law setting term limits for congresspeople, the Court reasoned that 
states possess only a limited power to regulate federal elections.425 
State procedures are “not a reserved power of the States, but rather 
[are] delegated by the Constitution.”426 Accordingly, efforts to federal-
ize procedures require state workers to abide by the federal rules and 
regulations.  
It is worth considering that state and local officials may resist fed-
eral oversight. Even a proposed bill would likely attract pushback from 
state and local officials. Richard Hasen speculates over how “the lobby 
of local and state election administrators” would gather “considerable” 
forces to block central federal election administration.427 “The common 
wisdom about election administration reform . . . is that anything that 
increases a federal role over state and local election administrators is 
a nonstarter because of the power of these groups,” he writes.428 Even 
surviving the speculative forces, the MEA’s execution could face a 
groundswell of resistance from state and local officials. Although ac-
tively hindering or obstructing federal officials would be illegal, state 
 
 419. Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 388 (1880). 
 420. Id. 
 421. Id. 
 422. Id. at 389. But Justice Bradley remained optimistic. “There is not the slightest dif-
ficulty in a harmonious combination into one system of the regulations made by the two 
sovereignties, any more than there is in the case of prior and subsequent enactments of the 
same legislature.” Id. at 384. 
 423. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995). 
 424. Id. at 808. 
 425. Id. at 779–80. 
 426. Id. at 805. 
 427. Hasen, New Institutionalism, supra note 10, at 1098. 
 428. Id. 
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or local officials may assert noncompliance with some federal orders, 
resent the federal presence, or simply leave their positions altogether. 
Any hypothetical FEAA would likely—and quickly—issue clear regu-
lations detailing best practices in dealing with recalcitrant local offi-
cials and appropriate sanctions against them. 
Finally, it is worth considering the risk that federal election observ-
ers could be used to chill, or even threaten, voter participation. Nefar-
ious actors can use election monitoring to intimidate. In 2016, for ex-
ample, a federal judge in Ohio issued a temporary restraining order 
(though the Sixth Circuit stayed it) against the Trump campaign and 
Roger Stone after now President Trump “encourage[ed] rally at-
tendees to monitor ‘certain areas’” and his supporters promised to “ag-
gressively patrol polling places.”429 While federal oversight officials 
would ideally be well-meaning (like the vast, vast majority of poll 
workers), the FEAA can promulgate strict guidelines to ensure and 
advertise their nonpartisan nature. 
V.   CONCLUSION 
The original Enforcement Acts created a complex system of federal 
election regulation that lasted for a generation in the late nineteenth 
century. The federal oversight program existed during an era of in-
tense political partisanship, amidst charges of rampant voter fraud, 
and distrust of national authority. Despite their imperfections, the 
Acts helped protect the suffrage of African Americans in the South and 
created mechanisms to root out the most egregious forms of voter fraud 
in urban areas. 
The United States’ national election infrastructure today is a “rad-
ically decentralized” hodgepodge of state and local systems.430 That 
structure and its many known imperfections need not be permanent. 
The federal government can enact significant legislation under the 
Elections Clause and the Fifteenth Amendment to protect voters and 
to ensure that elections run efficiently, neutrally, and fairly. One ave-
nue is to establish an agency of election professionals to create uniform 
standards, rules, and regulations, to run oversight programs to ensure 
that voters can efficiently and fairly vote, and to adjudicate election-
related disputes. The old Enforcement Acts provide a blueprint for ex-
ecuting this vision of bold institutional change. And there is an appe-
tite for electoral reform, as evinced by H.R. 1’s introduction and its 236 
 
 429. Ohio Democratic Party v. Ohio Republican Party, No. 16-cv-02645, 2016 WL 
6542486 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 4, 2016), stayed, No. 16-4268, 2016 WL 6608962 (6th Cir. Nov. 6, 
2016), application to vacate stay denied, 137 S. Ct. 15 (2016) (mem.); see also Hasen, From 
Bad to Worse, supra note 20, at 639. 
 430. Hasen, Lawlessness Principle, supra note 340, at 988. 
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cosponsors,431 as well Senator Elizabeth Warren’s election reform plan 
to create uniform federal standards.432 Perhaps one scholar’s predic-
tion that “the adoption of nonpartisan election administration is 
simply not on the horizon” is overstated.433 Then, in the words of 
W.E.B. Du Bois, the United States would no longer be “the only mod-
ern nation in the world that dares not control its own elections.”434  
 
 431. See Cosponsors: H.R.1—116th Congress (2019–2020), Congress.gov https://www. 
congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/1/cosponsors [https://perma.cc/4Z5F-KC95]. 
 432. See supra note 5. 
 433. Gaughan, Illiberal Democracy, supra note 23, at 123. 
 434. W.E.B. Du Bois, The Negro Citizen, in THE NEGRO IN AMERICAN CIVILIZATION 461, 
469 (Charles S. Johnson, ed. 1930). 
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